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Somalia has experienced protracted conflict since 1991. A number of peace enforcement 
operations were undertaken to bring stability to the country but they encountered difficult 
conditions resulting to the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces.  Following the struggle for 
control of Somalia among armed groups, countries closer to Somalia were forced to intervene 
because their security was threatened. During this period, there was a continental 
arrangement to conduct peace operations in Africa. As a result, an African Union (AU) Peace 
Support Operations (PSOs) was deployed in Somalia. The mission called the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) came at a time when Somalia had undergone a series of 
peace and reconciliation conferences, and had to ensure that the activities of armed groups 
was curbed in order  to bring stability to Somalia. Although the mission has faced a 
significant number of challenges, it is important to take note of its achievements. AMISOM 
has managed to recruit peacekeepers from a range of African countries to fight against the 
militant group called Al-Shabaab. In March 2011 it started a military campaign to support the 
then Transitional Federal Government (TGF) forces to retake Mogadishu and the whole of 
Somalia from Al-Shabaab. This initiative illustrates that the mission is making an effort to 
articulate and push the extension of state authority in Somalia, in an effort to bring stability to 
the state. Given the prospect of the mission to succeed, it is important that the root causes are 
addressed in order to avoid a relapse into violent conflict. This research employs the use of 
conflict transformation theory, to assess AMISOM’s contribution to Somalia’s conflict 
transformation, by looking at transformative elements or activities that are addressing the root 
causes of the conflict. The use of this theoretical argument will help to determine the extent 
to which AMISOM has contributed to Somalia’s conflict transformation. AMISOM is the 
lead player in transforming the conflict. It is important for the mission to analyse its role; its 
successes; to reflect on gaps; and redesign approaches. This may be required so that a relapse 
into violence may be avoided. The aim of the research therefore is to examine AMISOM’s 
contribution to ending the conflict in Somalia, with reference to its role in addressing the root 
causes of the conflict directly or indirectly as its implements its mandate. The main objectives 
of the research are to examine AMISOMs contribution to ending the conflict in Somalia, 
identify initiatives which AMISOM can undertake to transform the conflict and provide 
concrete recommendations on the role of AMISOM in transforming the conflict in Somalia. 
At the end of the study, the research finds that AMISOM has brought some amount of 
stability to Mogadishu, where ordinary populations are conducting businesses on normal 
basis. The research also finds that the mission’s activities are largely focused on counter-
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insurgency strategies; the expansion of Somalia’s state authority, capacity building of 
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                                              Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Content of the Study 
Somalia has been in conflict since 26
th
 January 1991 when a coalition of clan-based armed 
opposition groups ousted the nation's long-standing military government of Major General 
Mohamed Siad Barre. Various clans began competing for influence in the power vacuum that 
followed. There was an aborted UN peacekeeping attempt in the mid- 1990s to restore order. 
A period of decentralization ensued, characterized by a return to customary and religious law 
in many areas as well as the establishment of autonomous regional governments in the 
northern part of the country. In the south, armed factions led by a militia group called the 
United Somali Congress (USC) and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, in particular, clashed as each 
sought to exert authority over the capital (Menkhaus, 2003)  
According to Africa Watch (1990), the conflict has claimed the lives of more than 50,000 
people, and left thousands as refugees. The conflict has also affected the infrastructural 
development in the health, education and economic sectors of Somalia.  In an attempt to curb 
the conflict during the early 1990s, the UN established the United Nations Mission in 
Somalia (UNOSOM I) in April 1992, to provide humanitarian and relief support to victims of 
the conflict. Due to the rising security threat against UN personnel, UNOSOM I was 
transformed into UNOSOM II in May 1993,  to take appropriate action, including 
enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for 
humanitarian assistance, and the rebuilding of the economic, social and political life of the 
people. However, UNOSOM II was unable to disarm the warlords due to the divisions among 
the armed groups. This led to the establishment of multiple armed factions (Clarke, 1993).    
This led to an increased attack on UN peacekeepers, and civilians that forced the mission to 
withdraw in March 1997.  UNOSOM II assisted in saving lives by securing food supplies. It 
facilitated some local agreements that improved security, reopened the airport and seaport in 
Mogadishu, capital of Somalia and supported the revival of key services, and the creation of 
local NGOs. It also provided employment and injected huge resources into the economy.  
This benefitted a new business class, in the main.  However, the mission was unable to 
mediate an end to hostilities or disarm armed factions. UN-facilitated peace conferences in 
Addis Ababa in 1993 and Kenya in 1994 did not engender a process of national reconciliation 
and state revival (Conciliation Resources, 2010). The Inter-governmental Authority on 
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Development (IGAD), which Somalia is a member of, established the Inter-governmental 
Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) in September 
2006, which took on the responsibility of mitigating the conflict until the AU could take over.  
Efforts by the IGASOM to bring stability to the country, failed to achieve the desired 
outcome.  
 
These efforts failed because seemingly there was an overall lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the Somali clan system, and peacemaking leadership in the Somali society 
(Adam, 2008). Furthermore, neighboring countries, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, in some 
way contributed to Somalia’s internal animosities, coupled with the fact that international aid 
agencies had multiple layers of interests in the region (Moller, 2009). Also, some aid 
agencies had veiled interests in the continuation of the Somali crisis. These include the 
continuation of humanitarian work in Somalia and its neighboring countries, whilst serving 
the political interest of the countries they represented (Mahmood, 2011).  AMISOM was then 
established by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 8960) (2007) to 
maintain stability, and transform the conflict, by rebuilding the state.  Despite the role 
AMISOM has played, stability in the country is still fragile as the root causes of the conflict 
remain largely unaddressed.  
 
Most scholars (Daniels, 2012; Harper, 2010; and Greg, 2013), in their research on the conflict 
in Somalia, and the subsequent disintegration of the state, have mentioned three root causes. 
These are: the colonial legacy; clan system; and economic factors.  Somalia was subjected to 
colonialism, which partitioned the country into five parts, namely, British Somaliland in the 
north, Italian Somalia in the south, the French Somali coast in Djibouti, Ogaden in the west 
and the NFD (Abdullahi, 1997). The subsequent attempt to reintegrate these different Somali 
inhabited parts led the state, which emerged in 1960, to enter into conflict with neighboring 
states such as Kenya and Ethiopia. These conflicts led Somalia to eventually disintegrate.  
Somalia is a lineage-based society, in which virtually all members of society enjoy 
membership in a patrimonial clan-family. Each clan-family is in turn subdivided by clan, sub-
clan, and sub-sub-clan, all on the basis of a Somali’s extended family tree (Mansur, 
1995:123). Depending on circumstances, different levels of lineage identity can be mobilized 
politically, making Somali clan system very fluid and unstable in nature (Elmi, 2010:47). 
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While clannism has long hindered internal cohesion through division and fragmentation, 
competition for land, power and cattle has resulted in deep seated clashes. In order to address 
these root causes, significant change is required in the cultural and political construct of the 
country. Though AMISOM with support from the UN is striving to liberate the state from its 
dominant armed group – Al-Shaabab, and restore legitimate political control, efforts to 
address internal cohesion between clan members is still a challenge.  
According to I. M. Lewis (1980), various schools of thought explained the causes of the 
conflict in Somalia: the primordial or ancient hatreds, the constructionist perspective, and the 
instrumental schools. The primordial school argues that clan identity is the main cause that 
initiates, escalate, and perpetrate the conflict. The constructionist perspective, which is best 
articulated by Catherine Besteman (1999), argues that the cultural construction of racial 
stratification configured the patterns of violence, but the conflict is rooted in the political 
economy of class and regional dynamics. On the other hand, the instrumentalist school argues 
that clan identity is used to obtain resources and power that fuel the conflict (Mansur, 
1995:117).  However, Ismail (1992), and Besteman (1996), have reduced them to two 
namely; ‘traditionalist’ and ‘transformationist’. The traditionalist view lays emphasis on 
ancient clan hatred, while the transformationist view supports the constructionist perspective, 
(Karanja, 2009) and also added that all the peacemaking interventions that have been 
implemented over the years have been based on either one or a combination of these schools 
of thought.  
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
This research employs the theory of conflict transformation to explore the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM’s) contribution to conflict resolution in Somalia. The study is 
needed to clarify whether the AU is currently using the right approach to end the conflict. 
The study will also provide recommendations targeted at the AU for a way forward in 
bringing lasting peace to Somalia. 
1.3 Research Problem:  
Though AMISOMs focus is on peace enforcement operations, it has undertaken a series of 
tasks to extend state authority and protect civilians. With the ongoing perception among 
Somalis and practitioners that peace enforcement operations in Somalia might not bring 
absolute peace, it is imperative to promote key aspects of conflict transformation – in 
particular building relationships and addressing root causes. While one may question the 
possibility to undertake this approach in the midst of combat operations, it is, however, a 
16 
 
viable option. For instance, ordinary Somalis can be invited to large forums where their views 
and concerns will be heard and taken into consideration. 
 
Situated in the horn of Africa, Somalia is at the crossroads between the African and Arab 
cultures, controlling the passage to the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Mediterranean, the 
Suez Canal, and access to the port of Djibouti (Torranzano 1995: 9-12). Ethnically 
homogeneous (Somalis), Somali society is distinct from other multi-ethnic sub-Saharan 
African societies with the exception of Burundi and Rwanda. The population of 
approximately 10 million is made up of six major clan families: the Darod, the Isaaq, the Dir 
and the Hawiye, the Rahanwein, and the Digil (Torranzano, 1995: 9). These clans are made 
up of family trail and tribes.  The clan families usually have a similar ancestral genesis and 
they are interconnected through intricate networks of social relationships (Ssereo, 2003: 1), 
which extend over clan territories marked with fluid borders, within the national territory.  
Protracted conflict spurred into the country in the 1990s, when the government of President 
Siad Barre was overthrown in January 1991. Several guerrilla groups that fought against Siad 
Barre's regime gained control over different parts of the country. In subsequent months, 
factionalism within these groups, lack of control by these groups over armed forces within 
their regions, and the emergence of new military and political groups challenging existing 
spheres of influence created a situation in which few regions of Somalia are free from ethnic 
and political hostility. Corruption, nepotism and the competition for resources and alliance 
helped to fuel the conflict.  
 
As a result of the fighting to overthrow Siad Barre, and the subsequent hostilities, there are an 
estimated 1.5 million Somali refugees in the horn of Africa and Kenya (UNHCR, 2013: 1). 
As tensions rose, political groups degenerated into warlordism and rival factions.  A series of 
military interventions ensued with little or no progress. In recent years, security has 
improved, as the country now has a democratic federal government in place. However, 
security and humanitarian conditions are still complex. Competition for power and resources 
still continues unabated, coupled with clan politics and the uncertainties posed by Al-
Shaabab. These factors have posed a key threat to peace in Somalia. Noting that military 
efforts have been undertaken for so long, there is a possibility that military action cannot 
bring a permanent solution to the conflict in Somalia. In this light, it is possible that a change 
in attitude and behavior triggered by relationship building, trust and understanding can touch 
the fundamental construct of the people’s ideology to bring an end to violent conflict. These 
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views put forward by conflict transformation theorists can address the root causes of the 
conflict in parallel to the need to strengthen security and state institutions.  
1.4 Rationale or Significance of Research 
In order to end the conflict in Somalia and prevent further violence, the international 
community established AMISOM.  This has accomplished a lot through various mandates, 
and models of support. As a consequence, many civilians or ordinary Somalis are less prone 
to attacks which are under AMISOM’s areas of control. These mandates include the renewal 
of AMISOMs mandate in 2013 and the establishment of the UNSOM by UNSCR 2102.  The 
models of support are the various forms of contribution – financial and logistical from troop 
contributing countries, and the international community. AMISOM has been operational for 
seven years and even though progress has been made in helping the TFG take control of most 
parts of Somalia, the mission is still faced with continued challenges of counter attacks by Al-
Shabaab, and the violence from clan rivalries. As a result, the effectiveness of the mission is 
threatened. These challenges could also lead to an eventual take-over by the UN because of 
the need for robust peacekeeping. 
 
The conflict between Al-Shabaab and the Somali government is currently ongoing, and a UN 
mission has been authorized to work alongside AMISOM with the mandate to protect 
civilians and stabilize the security situation in the country. This research will analyse 
AMISOMs progress in Somalia, particularly in addressing the root causes using the conflict 
transformation theory. The research will then provide recommendations targeted at the AU 
for a way forward in bringing lasting peace in Somalia. The research will also help to clarify 
whether the AU is currently using the right approach to end the conflict in Somalia. 
 
Although Peacock (2011), Mugisha (2011), and Hull and Svensson (2008), undertake an in-
depth analysis of the root causes of the conflict, and the challenges and progress of the 
mission; their research does not focus on addressing these root causes. Perhaps, this is 
because stability and security was a priority at that time. For Hull and Svensson (2008), 
analysis of the conflict was needed in order to find an alternative to ending the conflict.  This 
research argues for a conflict transformation approach that emphasizes the need to address 
the root causes of the conflict as the key focus for the restoration of stability.  Since 
AMISOM has a peace enforcement mandate, the research will also analyse the progress of its 
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operations in rebuilding governance and security structures as per its mandate, and 
recommend relevant approaches to bringing stability in Somalia.  
As the lead player in transforming the conflict, it is important for the mission to analyse its 
role amidst the successes to reflect on gaps, and redesign better approaches for future efforts. 
This will impede a relapse into violence.  
 
1.5 Aims and Objectives of Research 
The aim of this research is to examine AMISOM’s contribution to ending the conflict in 
Somalia, with reference to its role in addressing the root causes of the conflict directly or 
indirectly as its implements it mandate, using the conflict transformation theory. This theory 
which forms the basis of the argument of this research stresses the importance of 
transforming relationships and interest which is aimed at fostering long-term peace and 
stability by addressing the root causes of conflict.  The research will provide concrete 
recommendations on the way forward to conflict transformation in Somalia. The 
recommendations will be useful to help actors in their effort to resolve the conflict. 
 
The main objectives of this study are to:  
 Examine AMISOM’s contributions to ending the conflict in Somalia.  
 Identify and map the nature and role of the mission in conflict transformation efforts  
 Develop initiatives which AMISOM can undertake to effectively transform the conflict in 
Somalia 
 Provide concrete recommendations on  the role of AMISOM  in  transforming the conflict 
in Somalia   
1.6 Research Questions 
Though AMISOM in support of the UN is striving to end violent conflict in Somalia from the 
dominant armed group – Al-Shabaab and restore legitimate political control, efforts to 
address clannism and other root causes remain a challenge. The country will likely remain in 
partial anarchy if the root causes are not addressed. Thus, the research seeks to answer the 
following questions: 
 To what extent has AMISOM contributed to conflict transformation efforts in Somalia? 
 Considering AMISOM peace enforcement options, what role should it play in conflict 
transformation efforts in Somalia? 
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 What initiatives should AMISOM pursue in undertaking conflict transformation efforts in 
Somalia? 
 What are the gaps and limitations that inhibit AMISOM from contributing to conflict 
transformation efforts in Somalia? 
1.7 Limitation of the Study 
This study required travel to Somalia to conduct field research and obtain relevant data. 
However, conducting interviews with the relevant respondents proved challenging as some 
respondents were not available for interviews considering they were away on tactical and 
unsafe missions. However, because of the event of limited resources and unavailability of key 
respondents; the study relied on secondary sources to fill in information where   interviewees 
were unavailable. The implications of this is that the research may have difficulties finding 
all the relevant information needed, as the availability of certain types of information on 
Somalia, such as current progress made by AMISOM is limited. This lack of sufficient data 
impeded evidence to showcase a strong hypothesis on the need to address the root causes of 
the conflict.  
 
1.8 Structure of the Dissertation 
1. Chapter One: This chapter focuses on the introduction to the research. This includes: 
the rationale and relevance of the research, the hypothesis, research questions, 
objectives, the research problem and significance of the study. It also provides an 
overview of the structure of the research, as well as the limitations of the study. 
2. Chapter Two: This chapter consists of the literature review and theoretical framework. 
The review included a comprehensive analysis on broader peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement operations and state-building in Somalia. The theoretical framework will 
unpack conflict transformation and discuss its relevance and applicability to the study. 
3. Chapter Three: This chapter explains the research methodology and contextualizes 
Somalia and the conflict.  
4. Chapter Four: This chapter analyses the result and findings of the research. It 
discussed the data collected, and explains the key findings and conclusions drawn from 
the data.     
5.  Chapter Five: This chapter consists of the conclusion and recommendations from the 
research findings.   
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                                                      Chapter Two 
                Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
2. 1 Introduction  
This chapter consists of the literature review and theoretical framework. The review includes 
a comprehensive discourse on broader peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations. The 
comprehensive review on broader peacekeeping and peace enforcements are central to the 
research as it navigates the various shifts that have occurred in peacekeeping operations since 
its evolution from a traditional to a multidimensional peace operation. It provides an 
understanding of the broader PSOs context in which AMISOM is operating. The review also 
discusses a new model for peace operations looking at AU peacekeeping, to unfold the source 
of the regional framework for peace operations in Somalia. Since AMISOM is under the 
umbrella of a regional organisation – the AU, the composition and experiences of the AU in 
peacekeeping is relevant to understanding the nature and mandate in which AMISOM is 
operating. Thus, the chapter reviews the civilian component of the AU, the AU’s peace 
operations experiences and the AMISOM Concept of   operations (CONOPs). Noting that the 
context of the conflict in Somalia has been going on for years, and that several peace-building 
and conflict transformation attempt as well as state-building efforts has been established and 
underway in the midst of AMISOMs operation, the chapter reviews the concept of state-
building and peace-building to clearly establish where AMISOM stands between the two for 
the purpose of the analysis of the findings in chapter four. This chapter discusses the context 
of state-building in Somalia, its link to human security and the critical controversy to state-
building in Somalia. It also examines the legacy state-building has had in Somalia. The 
theoretical framework adopted for this research is the Conflict Transformation Theory. 
Conflict transformation is portrayed as an interconnected process of effectively changing 
relationships, attitudes, behavior, interests and dynamics in conflict-sensitive settings. 
Importantly, “it also addresses underlying structures, cultures and institutions that encourage 
and condition violent political and social conflict” (Galtung, 1995:1). This chapter also 
unpacked conflict transformation, and established its relevance and applicability to the study. 
It unpacked the meaning and understanding of conflict transformation; the relevance of the 
theory to the research, and agents of transformation in protracted social conflict. 
 




2.3 The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping Operations 
Peacekeeping has evolved to take on new strategies, and approaches in modern conflict. This 
is because, short term operations of restoring stability and security has proven to address 
violence for a short period of time, while conflict often re-escalates. This has been a 
challenge for UN peacekeeping mostly in intra-state conflict. Due to these lessons learnt, 
peacekeeping has to accompany programmes designed to prevent the re-occurrence of 
conflict. Though every context is different, peacekeeping has adopted a multidimensional 
approach, where it implements its mandate through an integration of military, police and 
civilian role. As a result of this multidimensionality, peacekeeping has moved from what is 
termed traditional, which includes, creating of buffer zones, maintaining military presence, 
cease fire, and assist parties to reach an agreement. Peacekeeping now encompasses roles 
such as restoring the states’ ability to provide security and maintain public order, 
strengthening rule of law and respect for human rights, supporting election processes, 
promoting social and economic recovery, including the resettlement of refugees (Geuhenno, 
2008: 7). Also, peacekeepers undertake early peace-building roles such as Disarmament 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of combatants, security sector reforms, establishing 
a protective environment for civilians (Holt and Taylor 2009:33), restoration and extension of 
state authority, and clearing of land mines. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations may 
support the restoration and extension of state authority by creating an enabling security 
environment, providing support to the restoration and extension of state authority which may 
include efforts to develop political participation, as well as operational support to the 
immediate activities of state institutions.  
 
This research follows a lineage of studies that attempt to proffer an alternative solution and 
approach to transforming the conflict in Somalia. Peacock (2011) argued that the solution to 
the Somali conflict can no longer be sought solely through AMISOM. Instead, a significant 
focus must be placed on a political solution which includes: building the institutions of the 
AU and re-engaging the international community, to strengthening the armed forces of 
Somalia. While this assertion could not address the root causes of the conflict, strengthening 
of the AU’s institutions will boost its PSOs in Somalia. In Peacock’s research on the 
successes and challenges of AMISOM, he questioned the extent to which AMISOM has 
contributed to political stability in Somalia, and concluded that the mission cannot resolve the 
conflict on its own considering the numerous difficulties. These difficulties include a series of 
operational challenges which stemmed from the problematic nature of the AU institutional 
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environment, the series of attacks launched against AMISOM troops, and the lack of 
resources available to the mission. Hull and Svensson (2008), in their effort to assess 
AMISOMs role and capability to maintain stability in Somalia put forward another 
theoretical debate in 2008 that looks at questions on whether the AU will be able to maintain 
the concept of African solutions to African problems. They concluded that the AU will only 
be able to maintain the concept of African solutions and conduct successful peace operations 
with support from the international community. Without it, no progress can be made (Hull & 
Svensson, 2008:35-49). 
 
Moreover, Mugisha (2011), in his quest to assess the challenges of Somalia, concluded that 
the essential element for success of the mission is the support of the public to the TFG. In 
order for this support to be attained, fundamental root causes of the conflict should be 
addressed. Bruton (2010) advances a strategy of “constructive disengagement’’ in addressing 
the security challenge in Somalia. Notably, he called for the United States to signal that it will 
accept an Islamist authority in Somalia—including AL-Shabaab, as long as it does not 
impede international humanitarian activities, and refrains from both regional aggression and 
support for international jihad. 
 
Johan Galtung (2005) focuses on conflict transformation theory in his empirical research as 
an option for ending violent conflict. In his view, the goal of conflict transformation is peace; 
the capacity to handle conflict creatively and non-violently. He concluded that the vision of a 
sustainable outcome acceptable to all parties may transform the conflict long before any 
agreement. By this, he argues that outside parties can withdraw, while the actual parties start 
to build their own conflict transformation capacity. The goal is not any final solution, but to 
transform the conflict and build the capacity for the parties themselves to handle the conflict 
non-violently and creatively (Galtung, 2000:5). Elmi (2010) explores the benefit of using 
education for social change in Somalia. He argues that education can be a vehicle for long-
term social transformation.  Elmi, (2010) further envisaged that even though there is a general 
lack of resources to boost the educational system in Somalia, education can play a key role in 
transforming the conflict. 
 
2.4 AU Peacekeeping 
The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 by the adoption of 
the OAU Charter by representatives of 32 African governments. The  aims of the OAU were: 
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to promote the unity and solidarity of African States; co-ordinate and intensify their co-
operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; defend their 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; eradicate all forms of colonialism from 
Africa; promote international co-operation, and co-ordinate, and harmonize members’ 
political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and 
defence policies (DIRCO, 2014). Whereas the OAU was guided by the principle of 
sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of member states, the AU established at the 
Fourth Extraordinary session of the OAU Assembly in Libya in 2002 in acknowledgement 
that the scourge of conflict in Africa posed a major challenge to socio-economic development 
on the continent, has the right to intervene in the affairs of member states when situations 
concerning war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity  prevail (AU Constitutive Act, 
2002). Though the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security lies 
with the UN, chapter eight of the UN Charter makes provision for regional arrangements to 
settle disputes (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). Article 54 of the UN Charter indicates 
that ‘’the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or 
in contemplation under regional arrangements by regional agencies - for Africa, the AU, for 
the maintenance of international peace and security’’ (UNDPKO, 1999: 6). To this end, a UN 
peacekeeping operation is guided by the following legal frameworks: UN Charter, 
peacekeeping mandates, International law, other legal documents, National law, Internal UN 
rules and guidelines, mission rules and directives. Whereas African-led peace operations are 
guided by: AU Policy Framework for the establishment of the ASF, and the Military Staff 
Committee (MSC), the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), Protocol relating to 
the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the ASF Peace Support 
Operations (PSOs) Doctrine and other Communiqué relating to the AU PSC. 
 
APSA is holistic, as it consists of the following interconnected decision making bodies that 
support peace and security on the continent. As noted by Kasumba and De Coning (2010), 
APSA represents Africa’s common framework to deal with peace and security issues, 
following lessons learnt from the Rwandan genocide. According to Okumu and Jaye, the AU 
PSC has the mandate to resolve conflict by deploying peace support missions through the 
ASF. The ASF consists of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their countries 
of origin. The concept of a standby capacity is not intended to have a standing army in 
Africa, but rather a standby arrangement that consists of contributions from AU member 
states and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). 
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The standby capacity for Africa is important for a rapid response to conflict linked to the ASF 
six deployment scenario most especially in genocide situations where the international 
community does not act promptly (Okumu & Jaye, 2010). The Regional Standby Forces 
(RSFs) that makes up the ASF include: the East African Standby Force (EASF), the 
Economic Community of West African States Standby Force (ESF), the North African 
Regional Capability (NARC), the SADC Standby Force (SSF), and the Economic 
Community of Central African States Standby Force (ECCAS). The AU PSC has undertaken 
peacekeeping missions in Sudan, Darfur, Burundi, Somalia, Central African Republic, Mali 
and the Comores. 
 
The ASF PSOs doctrine clearly illustrated the AU PSOs strategic context, concepts and 
direction. According to this doctrine, the AU envisions a continent united in preventing and 
acting against conflict. This gives the AU the responsibility to capacitate itself with the 
operational structures to intervene where there is a threat to peace. In as much as unity among 
states is the center of this planning, the AU recognized the sovereign rights of states to decide 
whether or not they want to participate in multidimensional peace operations (ASF Doctrine, 
2006).  Under the AU grand strategy for peace and security on the continent, the AU peace 
mission planning processes at all levels must strive to identify the real underlying causes of a 
conflict, and identify associated dependencies and linkages in the ‘cause and effect’ analysis. 
Having perceived that the PSOs environment will be complex, and the heads of civilian 
components and commanders at all levels must endeavor to identify where power and 
influence resides, and also understand societal perceptions, the mission can create the 
environment for reconstruction by other agencies. It is also important to note that under this 
grand strategy, care must be taken to prevent the undermining effect of negative perception 
(ASF Doctrine, 2006).   
 
2.5 The AU and its Peace Operations Experiences 
The AU has worked closely with RMs to coordinate all its peace operations. The lessons 
drawn from past and present AU peace operations indicated that AU-led peacekeeping 
operations in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia, face financial and logistical challenges. In the 
evolving roles of the AU and RMs (2010), Wafula and Jaye (2010) noted that the key 
challenge facing the AU in its peace operations is  peace-building  and post conflict 
reconstruction as envisaged by the Brahimi report in 2002 ( Okumu and Jaye, 2010:19). 
Despite this challenge, the AU and its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have 
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significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage peace operations in recent 
years. The AU took the lead in peace operations in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia. The AU 
continues to put the relevant policy frameworks and structures in place to build its capacity.  
As Bakwesegha (1993) noted, Africa now has a more comprehensive peace and security 
architecture in place, but many of the new structures needs to be operational (Bakwesegha, 
1993). One key operational framework that the AU has put in place to carry out an effective 
peace support operation is related to the Protection of Civilians (PoC). Having noted that 
PSOs in Africa are increasingly tasked with the PoC, and the ability of PSOs to deliver in this 
respect is closely linked to the legitimacy and credibility of the mission, the AU seeks to put 
the relevant modalities in place.  The AU in 2012 developed draft guidelines for the PoC 
within its operations. The guidelines are intended to assist the PSC in preparing for PSOs, 
and in the development of mandates and additional strategic documents. The guidelines aim 
to provide guidance on developing a consistent and effective strategy to implement protection 
objectives, in coordination with external protection actors, the host state, and local 
communities (Lamamra, 2012:4). The draft guidelines contains perceptions from the draft 
United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS) PoC Strategy Concept, (2009); the United 
Nations Missions in Darfur (UNAMID) Mission Directive No 2009/01: PoC in Darfur; the 
United Nations Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)/Protection Cluster 
Protection in Practice: Practical Protection Handbook for Peacekeepers; the Draft Code of 
Conduct for the Armed Forces and Security Services of West Africa adopted by the 
Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) Committee of Experts, (2006); the 
Aide-Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the PoC in Armed Conflict 
annexed to the Statement by the President of the Security Council, (2009), and Security 
Council Resolution 1894 (2009) adopted by the Security Council at its 6216th meeting on 11 
November 2009, (UN Doc. S/RES/1894, 2009). Whereas these draft guidelines are generic, 
the AU will narrow it down to suit the context of a mission specific PoC strategy. Currently, 
the AU is working towards a mission specific PoC strategy for AMISOM. While the AU has 
become an important peace operations actor on the African continent, a major feature of its 
peace operations is its reliance on international support. This is fairly because the AU is 
comprised of African countries that are the least developed countries in the world,  and they 
are often faced with severe economic backlog. Thus, the AU’s ability to finance its own 




The success of AU peace operations is largely dependent on cooperation with the UN. Both 
the UN Security Council and the PSC of the AU have a vested interest in conducting more 
effective peace operations in Africa. These operations are once again in high demand with 
possible new deployments in Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Mali, and Sudan. AU deployments have also increased largely due to AU-UN 
collaboration in Somalia and Mali. In February 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed the 
expansion of the UN support package for AMISOM, and increased its uniformed personnel 
from 12,000 to 17,731 (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 2). Despite the proliferation of UN-AU 
coordination mechanisms and a growing mutual recognition that each institution has its 
comparative advantages, there is still significant scope for enhancing collaboration between 
the AU, its RECs, and training institutions, for effective PSOs in Africa. As such, cooperation 
and harmonization of best practices is seen as effective for all AU peace operations (Boutellis 
and Williams, 2013: 2).  
 
2.6 AMISOM Concept of Operations 
The AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPs) indicated that AMISOM should initially 
deploy, control and stabilize the security situation in Mogadishu. The CONOPs are 
indications that direct the operational work of the mission. The CONOPs indicated that the 
operations of AMISOM will be conducted in three phases. Phase I which is the deployment 
phase is the initial deployment of 9 infantry battalions to Sector 2, which is Mogadishu. This 
will involve execution by the Head of the mission’s military component. The AMISOM 
Force Commander will ensure the mounting of the AMISOM Head Quarters (HQ), and also 
provide for a secure and safe environment in and around Mogadishu, thereby providing for 
the conditions to execute Phase 2 and allow the Special Representative of the Chairperson of 
the AU Commission (SRCC) to relocate to Somalia. Phase II is the expansion of the mission 
by deployment of predominantly military units to other sectors. Phase III is the consolidation 
phase, and involves the comprehensive execution of  AMISOM’s mandate and key tasks as 
decided by the AU PSC. Phase IV is the redeployment/exit phase which will coincide with a 
foreseen handover to the UN (AMISOM, 2008). To this end, phase III of AMISOM operation 
is critical to state-building in Somalia as well as to the overall success of the mission. 
 
2.7 The Peace-building and State-building Concepts and Perception of AMISOM 
For the purpose of this research, it is important to distinguish the term nation-building from 
state-building. Calls and Cousens (2007) define state-building as actions undertaken, usually 
27 
 
by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually in order to overcome 
ethnic, sectarian or communal differences;  to counter alternate sources of identity and 
loyalty; and to mobilise a population behind a parallel state-building project (Call and 
Cousens, 2007: 1-10). According to this definition, the concept of nation-building may seem 
to be relevant to peace-building as well as state-building, but Calls and Cousens (2007) 
believe that the two concepts are different. Similarly, a clear understanding needs to be put 
forward between peace building and state-building (United Nations, 2007). Whereas 
Fukuyama’s (2004), Fritz and Menocal’s, (2007) definition of state-building focuses on 
building and strengthening of government institutions, the research will slightly shift away 
from this concept.  In the context of Somalia, this research will adopt the definition of state-
building put forward by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
(OECD). According to the OECD, state-building is a  
 “purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in 
relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between 
state and societal groups” (OECD, 2008:13).  
 
The OECD placed particular emphasis on state-society negotiation and the fact that state-
building strategies need to appreciate that states are comprised of more than formal 
institutions. A significant point to note is that successful state-building will almost always be 
driven by domestic action, but it can be considerably facilitated by well-targeted and 
responsive international assistance.  This will require state and international communities 
understanding of the historical movements and moments that have shaped a conflict state, 
recognizing that the nature of the state is dynamic, and appreciating that the bargains and 
relationships that affect comparative weakness, fragility or failure are continually shifting and 
renewing (OECD, 2008:14). Understanding these concepts is very helpful to define the type 
of design AMISOM will implement in assisting the FGS to build state institutions. UNSC 
Resolution 2125 (2013) emphasized the need for AMISOM to  strengthening  state 
institutions, economic and social development, and respect for human rights, and the rule of 
law as necessary elements  to create the conditions for a durable eradication of piracy and 
armed robbery on the Somalian coast.  It further emphasized that Somalia’s long-term 
security rests with the effective development of the Somali NSF by Somali authorities. To 
this end, AMISOM is working towards building state institutions in Somalia that is consistent 
with the OECD definition of state-building. The mission has even tended to engage in 
activities much more than what is stipulated in its mandate. Therefore, whilst AMISOM is 
28 
 
working towards building the peace with support from other actors on the ground, it tends to 
focus on building the state as well. In describing whether AMISOMs is undertaking peace-
building or state-building roles, a distinctive overlap is portrayed.  Barnette and Zurcher 
noted that “standing behind peace-building is state building” (Barnett and Zurcher, 2009: 26). 
In that light, states exist where there are government institutions like the Judiciary, 
Parliament, public service departments, and a well-coordinated executive, ruling a state, and 
have the capacity to command force and implement policies (Giddens, 1993: 309). State-
building requires that state institutions replace state elites in governing key areas of the state. 
Within this context, the state should be better placed to provide its local population with the 
essential elements of goods and services, with no barrier (Waldner, 1999:2). The 
International Dialogue on Peace-building and State-building (2010) concluded that peace-
building and state-building can contribute to overcoming conflict and fragility through 
different perspectives and approaches. AMISOM as a mission could be trapped between the 
use of this two concepts. In De Coning’s et al. conference proceedings on critical 
perspectives on contemporary peace-building: Towards change in Concepts and Approaches, 
it acknowledges that a major flaw in current peace-building in general is the use of 
approaches that are likely to favor institution or state-building rather than nation-building, 
reconciliation, social concerns, a focus on efficiency rather than effectiveness and the lack of 
local ownership (De Coning et al., 2010:11). AMISOM can assess its activities to detect if 
any of these flaws are evident, and draw up key lessons to design its peace-building and state-
building activities to achieve effectiveness. The need for this is that, peace-building has 
mostly fallen short of creating positive peace as a result of an ambiguous expectation of 
transforming all the odds of a society – an attempt that took other continents centuries to 
achieve. Also, the lack of local support structures, and the devastating effects of continuous 
armed conflict as determinants that affects the success of peacekeeping operations 
(Chesterman, 2004: 5) are to be taken into consideration in AMISOMs operation.  
Consequently, as Peace-builders strive to motivate the liberalization of the state from armed 
conflict, conflict parties may be keen to continue their struggle for legitimacy (Paris (2004: 
2). This argument can likely relate to AMISOM’s force operation in the sense that, despite 
efforts to re-build liberated areas, Al-Shaabab is continuously pushing to gain supremacy and 
recognition.  Considering this, it is important to examine the strategies of any action intended 
to build peace and the consequences it would yield. In that sense, there should be a 
connection between what key peace-builders want to achieve, the environment which they 
want to create, and the outcome of the interaction (Lake and Powell, 1999: 20). However, 
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complexities are evident in such proposed interactions.  Peace-builders can implement 
activities that can result in positive or negative outcomes for citizens in a particular country.  
Bernett and Zurcher noted that peace-builders can have specific targets that are opposed by 
government elites especially when peace-builders attempt to promote political inclusivity that 
makes room for opposition or rivals. The result of this can be devastating to peace-building 
and state-building if government elites choose to react using intimation and violence. 
Although Bernett and Zurcher noted that at the extreme, the elite might cooperate considering 
the potential manpower and resources that peace-builders have (Barnett and Zurcher, 2009: 
32). This research would add that there is a likely possibility in certain contexts where elites 
may not need such resources, and thus may not cooperate. The essential pattern of peace-
building here will be that of a compromised peace-building, where local elites and peace-
builders jointly determine areas where assistance is needed, thus limiting peace-builders to 
implement in certain areas that are intended to build the state (Barnette and Zurcher, 1999: 
33). However, Goodhand and Sedra (2006:3) noted that peace-builders and international 
support actors are likely to present conditionality’s or criteria that may urge local elites to 
accept new reforms to gain international support (Goodhand and Sedra, 1999: 3). 
 
In most cases, peace-building operations can be successful in bringing an end to violent 
conflict (Michael and Sambanis, 2006).  This is because comprehensive peace-building is 
meant to address the root causes of conflict, and build the required capacity needed by the 
state to foster conditions for a lasting positive peace. In societies experiencing intractable 
conflict, conditions for the development of institutions, intellectual tools and civic culture 
will likely promote individual and group ownership to resolve their differences (Barnett and 
Zurcher, 2009).  
 
2.7.1 The Legacy of State-building in Somalia 
At the time of the colonial era, the Italian and British colonial leaders or administrations did 
not put in place the necessary institutions and foundation for a strong central government. 
When independence was attained in 1960, the government that ensued was unable to 
strengthen its position. Also, those decentralised clan and sub-clan pastoral structures that 
specifies Somali cultural traits were seen as fundamentally different to a unified organized 
country or state. Pham (2012) noted that  
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“During unification very little thought was apparently given, either by enthused 
Somali nationalists or their international supporters, as to whether the European-style 
centralized state that was hastily created was necessarily appropriate for the diffuse 
nature of Somali society” (Pham, 2012:10).  
As a result of an unintended exclusion of traditional or local clan-based governance 
structures, the Somali idea of clan unification was presumed to fail. On the other hand, local 
operations of clan and sub-clan have caused the implementation of top-down western 
methods of governance more challenging in Somalia. According to Menkhaus (2006), “the 
inability to form a viable government over the past two decades has earned Somalia the 
dubious distinction of being the world’s foremost graveyard of externally sponsored state-
building initiatives” (Menkhaus, 2006:74). 
An example of a successful traditionally based stability in Somalia is evident in Somaliland. 
Doornbos (2002) indicated that “although it lacks international recognition, Somaliland is one 
typical example of a functioning sovereign state in the Horn of Africa. The unrecognized 
state of Somaliland has now functioned since 1991 as a self-sustaining state, and has 
repeatedly received positive attention from the international media for the way it has 
embarked upon post-conflict reconstruction” (Doornbos, 2002:95). Kibble (2001) further 
noted that “this is largely due to the bottom up approach at state building that derives its 
legitimacy from local clan elders and the local ownership of civil institutions, including stable 
economic, political, security and social welfare institutions (Kibble, 2001:18). Compared to 
international attempts at imposing western style government on Somalia, Kibble (2001) 
indicated that “the Somaliland ‘nation building’ process was more bottoms-up, and does 
function as a state” (Kibble, 2001:18).  Furthermore, Byrne (2013) specified that “the 
methods for state formation in Somaliland may provide the best model for stabilization 
efforts in greater Somalia’’ (Byrne, 2013: 122).  He noted that “it is clear that development in 
Somalia must focus on bottom-up, organic growth rather than the imposition of institutions 
from above’’ (Byrne, 2013:122). In essence, Somaliland has left a landmark legacy on 
relevance of bottom-up approach to Somalia state-building.  
 
2.7.2 The Context of State-building in Somalia 
“After two decades of conflict, Somalia is the world’s most fragile state” (Brookings Global 
Economy and Development, 2008).  Brookings Global Economy and Development (2008) 
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further noted that “Somalia has known periods of stability and security over decades, and 
some parts of it remain relatively free of violence. Multiple levels of armed conflict and 
insecurity exist and are increasing in some parts of the country. These include localised 
communal clashes over resources, political clashes over control of the state and its resources, 
regional involvement sometimes through proxies, and violence fuelled by global ideologies’’ 
Brookings Global Economy and Development, 2008:1)  .  In terms of the effects of conflict, 
UNHCR 2011 noted that “the effects of the conflict are far-reaching: 1.36 million people are 
internally displaced, and 43% of the population lives on less than $1 a day” (UNHCR, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 1: Map showing the figures of refugees in the Somali Region 
 
Figure 1 above shows that the region has recorded over 10.4 million IDPs in Somalia. The 
unemployment rate is above 60% (Somalia Joint Strategy Paper, 2008-2013). According to 
the United Nations (2011), “women and girls suffered disproportionately – a woman in 
Somalia has a 1 in 12 chance of dying during her reproductive years’’ (United Nations 
Somalia, 2011). DIFID (2011) indicated that “years of conflict, drought and flooding have 
caused a prolonged humanitarian crisis leading to 2.3 million people estimated to be in need 
of emergency support’’ (DIFID, 2011: 1). The instability in Somalia also presented has wider 
regional and economic ramifications that affected the resources of Somalia. Figure 2 below 





Figure 2: Map showing Somalia’s resources that have been affected by the conflict 
 
According to DIFID (2011), “It presents risks to regional stability, including in Kenya, 
Ethiopia and Uganda. It is the source of serious threats to the United Kingdom (UK) and 
elsewhere from terrorism, piracy and migration. Somalia is a priority country for the UK’s 
National Security Council (NSC)’’ (DIFID, 2011:1). According to Shay (2014), “Security  
was the subject of an international conference hosted by the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom (UK) in London in February 2012 at which partners agreed on a package of 
commitments to support Somalia through and beyond the critical transition period in 2012, 
and to reduce the threat it represents’’ (Shay, 2014: 22-25). As indicated by Department of 
International Development United Kingdom (DIFID’s, 2011) “it work is a core element of 
the UK government strategy for Somalia, which recognizes that the underlying causes of 
instability need to be addressed. Somalia is often thought of as three zones, with different 
characteristics. Semi-autonomous Puntland (about 2 million people) has government 
institutions of its own and a degree of stability, though no aspirations for independence. Like 
the rest of south-central Somalia, (about 3.5 million people) it continues to suffer from 
insecurity, criminality and the impact of piracy’’ (DIFID, 2011: 1). For DIFID, (2011), 
“despite the absence of central government institutions, effective development programmes 
are possible, particularly where local government functions effectively in the case of 
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Puntland and Somaliland’’ (DIFID, 2011). On another point of view, Shay (2014) indicated 
that “the current signs in Somaliland (about 2 million people) are more positive. The 
promising government there could maintain progress which might help foster stability for the 
rest of Somalia. Although the risk of spill over or displaced threats from the south is 
prevalent, Somaliland currently offers more opportunities for working with the government’’ 
Shay, 2014: 24).  
 
2.7.3 Human Security and State-building in Somalia 
From a theoretical standpoint, the concept of human security is best explained by the 
contrasting views of the neo-realist and post-modernist thinkers. The Neorealists argued that 
state security is paramount as it is the guardian of the nation and if the state is secure, the 
people are at peace (Buzan, 1991: 146). This approach focuses on the military capability of 
the state to deter external aggression, and to provide internal security. However, some point 
out that the state could be a security threat itself to its own citizens and the security of the 
state itself does not guarantee human security and freedom. In this context, the 
postmodernists propose a broadened conceptualization of security that embraces individuals 
and groups (Booth, 2005a).  In this sense, the target is not the state but the person. IIDEA 
(2006) indicated that “this argument forces the state to not only concentrate on the defence of 
the country but also the protection of the citizens and the well-being of the society. This 
means that security is not only physical security from harm or threats but also security risk 
from lack of human rights and any threat to human dignity and wellbeing such as hunger, and 
lack of economic opportunity’’ (IIDEA, 2006: 6). However, Querine (2011) argued that 
“both sides recognized the importance of the strength and capability of the state to provide 
security. This means that there is an agreement that a weak state cannot defend its territory 
and provide human security” (Querine, 2011:2). In Querine’s (2011)’s view, “Somalia has 
been weakened by years of civil war and the type of security approach that is likely focused 
on is state security’’ (Querine, 2011:2). In order to achieve state security goals, the 
government of Somalia, the AU and the UN are engaged in creating robust institutions. Wade 
(1990) suggested robust institution “that can provide public services that are resilient to 
internal politicians and economic challenges, as well as external economic pressures’’ (Wade, 
1990:22-23). Lewis (2002) provides possible relevant ideas to the current institutional 
formation in Somalia. He noted that “states historical processes produce organic relations 
between political and civil society’’ (Lewis, 2002: 39-56).  According to Lewis (2002), “this 
means that through conflicts and negotiations, the particular interests of the different groups 
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in society will be merged at the political level, where national interests are portrayed in the 
state machinery, providing intellectual and moral unity’’ (Lewis 2002:40). Considering that is 
unity is a desired goal for society, Abdi (2012) buttress that “he emergence of state 
institutions will likely be responsive to societal needs and legitimacy. In the historical context 
of Somalia, post-colonial institutions were distant and unresponsive to the needs of average 
citizens due to a lack of vision, lack of government resources and delivery capacity. During 
the cold war, the state was marked by strong institutions with better economic development 
but also engaged in violence, exclusion and nepotism’’ (Abdi, 2012:5). Ssereo (2003) also 
provide some supporting statement to the view put forward by Abdi (2012). Ssereo (2003) 
noted that “since the collapse of the state in 1991, the new institutions that emerged were 
tribally based, as clan politics had been the norm for the past years. Tribal or clan politics has 
been considered as greed, but effectively employs the concept of tribal grievances to make 
the most on perceived inequalities, exclusion or oppression’’ (Ssereo, 2003: 27-39). Whereas 
there may be other arguments that tend to support clan politics in Somalia, Lesson (2007) 
thinks that the clannish politicians who have emerged “have wrecked the country as they 
have demolished many of the social and political institutions that unified the country, 
including institution of Somali citizenry (Lesson 2007:304). He further noted that clan 
politicians sometimes constitute clan identity and “sometimes clan based regional identity, 
leaving the people divided and in conflict. To solidify this process, clan politics continue to 
push for the re-construction of a clan based constitutional system that legalizes tribal 
territories. Such a proposition is enshrined in the provisional constitution’’ (Lesson, 2007: 
694). 
2.7.4 The Challenges to State-building in Somalia 
State-building activities have long been underway in an effort to bring peace to Somalia. In 
October 2002, hundreds of Somali political personnel “gathered for a national reconciliation 
conference in the Kenyan town of Eldoret” (International Crisis Group, 2002”.  This meeting 
which had international sponsors was among the several attempts to restore Somalia since 
1991. According to the International Crisis Group, 2002), the Eldoret initiative  enables 
“several improvements over previous efforts, including more unified support from external 
actors; more comprehensive representation of armed factions; and an agenda which 
emphasizes a long-term process focused on the resolution of key issues of conflict as against 
power-sharing (International Crisis Group, 2002). Despite these commendable descriptions, 
the process experienced lots of challenges which threaten to undermine the peace process 
(International Crisis Group, 2002). In an effort to examine the strategy towards state-building 
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in Somalia, it is important to address the issues separately.  Ken (2003) believes that part of 
the challenge encountered when analyzing issues in Somalia “is the tendency to combine 
Somalia’s multiple crises into a single issue’’ (Ken, 2003:2).   Specifically, he noted that the 
three distinct issues in Somalia – state collapse, armed conflict, and lawlessness must be 
separated in order to better understand and analyse them (Ken, 2003: 2).   In the case of 
Somalia, Clapham, (1996) noted that “in almost every instance of state collapse, a weak, 
nominal central government has managed to maintain juridical sovereignty most likely 
because of advice from other states’’ (Clapham, 1996: 22).  These interim judicial authorities 
are hardly successful.  In the past, Somalia’s inability to put together even the most 
minimalist central administration over the course of twelve years ranked the country among 
the world’s failed states (Esty and Gurr, 1999: 68). Ken (2013) argued that “the complete and 
sustained collapse of the central government in Somalia has created or contributed to 
numerous problems, but it is not inherently linked to other crises in Somalia, such as 
criminality and armed conflict’’ (Ken, 2003:20).  Despite these challenges, the example of 
Puntland has shown that some part of Somalia has repeatedly enjoyed “relatively high levels 
of peace, reconciliation, security, and lawfulness despite the absence of a central authority’’ 
(Ken, 2003: 3). However, the Pillars of Peace Somali Programme (2010) argued that “this is 
not to argue that a central state is unnecessary, but emphasize that one cannot attribute all of 
Somalia’s complex problems to the collapse of the central government’’ (Pillars of Peace 
Somali Programme, 2010: 36).   Ken (2003) further noted an effect to this, he noted  that 
“one consequence to this observation is that strategies to address problems such as 
criminality and armed conflict in Somalia which have a framework that presume that a 
revived central government is the solution, are likely to result in failure” (Ken, 2003:3). As 
such, in as much as Somalia is deemed a failed state, care needs to be taken for one not to 
assume that the state is unstable because of its failed nature (Armed Conflicts Report, 2009: 
5). 
 
Similarly, Menkhaus (2007) argued that “an attempt to revive a central state structure has 
actually exacerbated armed conflicts.  State-building and peace-building in his view are two 
separate and in some instance mutually complicated venture in Somalia’’ (Menkhaus, 
2007:40). For Menkhaus, “this is so because the revival of a state structure is viewed in 
Somali quarters as a zero-sum game, creating winners and losers in a game with potentially 
very high stakes” (Menkhaus 1997:58). A key lesson from the behaviors of clans was put 
forward by the UN (2002d). “Clans which gain control over a central government will use 
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such control to accrue economic resources at the expense of others and to wield the law’’. 
(UN, 2002d: 28-32). This clan patronage is likely some experiences Somalis have witnessed, 
which according to the UN “tends to produce conflict rather than peace whenever an effort is 
made to negotiate the establishment of a national government’’(UN, 2002d: 28-32) . The 
figure below shows Somalia’s ethnic group and clan family. 
 
 
Figure 3: Somalia ethnic groups and clan family 
 
For example, “the spate of armed clashes which in 2002 rendered south-central Somalia more 
insecure and inaccessible than at any time in the past ten years was partly linked to political 
tension in anticipation of the IGAD peace talks” (UN, 2002a: 6). The Figure below shows the 





Figure 4: The Regions of Somalia 
According to Menkhaus (1999), “the Somali crisis likely reflects the interests and objectives 
of key actors; thus, the creation of modern government institutions can likely be successful if 
all the actors are involved and actually benefitted from the building process (Menkhaus 1999: 
7). As the case of Somali Land, Upsall (2014) thought that “Somaliland’s attempts at state-
building have proven to be comparatively successful and should be viewed as a model for 
successful state creation in third world or tribal type states” (Upsall, 2014: 1). The attempt 
came from the bottom to the top. In Somalia, Upsall (2014) argued that “a top-down 
approach to state-building has been ineffective, and a lack of government structure at the time 
of independence created an environment in which clan based fracturing of the government 
was inevitable’’ (Upsall, 2014:1). Whilst this may be true, such approach has its own 
challenges. Seth (2010) indicated that “the biggest challenge to implementing a new 
paradigm of governance may lie not within Somalia itself, but within an international 
community that has repeatedly shown an inability to adapt a top-down approach to fragile 
states’’ (Seth, 2010:94).  To substantiate this view, Gordon’s (2012) analysis, explained 
that“according to the Failed States Index compiled by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy, 
Somalia has been the number one failed state in the world since 2008. The 2011 Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance rates Somalia an 8 out of 100, making it a state with no ability 
to create or implement policies that promote the wellbeing of people within its borders” 
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(Gordon & Gordon, 2012, p.103). Walls (2009) indicated that “there have been at least 
sixteen attempts since 1991 to reconcile Somalia” (Walls, 2009, p.372). During those times, 
Walls (2009) noted that “no representative government controlled the entire territory of 
Somalia, or sustained a prolonged continuation” (Walls, 2009:3).  In the past, several armed 
group’s controls some part of Somalia. Menkhaus (2006) that “Southern Somalia, the area 
formerly known as Italian Somaliland, is claimed by several groups, none of which maintains 
control over more than a few square miles, and in the case of the internationally recognized 
TNG and its successor, the TFG, only a few areas beyond the capital Mogadishu have been 
successfully controlled” (Menkhaus, 2006 p.92). Upsall (2014) also indicated that “multiple 
internationally supported transitional governments have been unable to take control of the 
country’s territory and repeated foreign interventions has been limited to provide stability” 
(Upsall, 2014: 1). Whilst these transitional governments are mostly imposed from the top, 
Bryne (2013) thinks that “Top-down approaches to government formation are likely based on 
the assumption that Somalia as a whole is a failed state based on a Westphalian model” 
(Bryne, 2013: 112).  Byrne noted that “this narrative of a failed state “occludes the reality of 
the situation, and is harmful to attempt to encourage development from within the country” 
(Byrne, 2013).  Debiel, et. al (2009) also believed that “the success story in neighboring 
Somaliland, which has led to a locally legitimate and organically grown government, has 
largely been ignored by international actors” (Debiel et al, 2009:38). He mentioned that “In 
states with little or no functioning government, there is evidence that social and political 
structures are characterized by ‘hybrid political orders’ which blend ‘traditional and modern 
norms and practices’” (Debiel et al, 2009:38). This argument or idea was also supported by 
Jhazbhay (2009). He noted that “Somaliland has used traditional practices to create a 
sustainable modern government by blending “modernity and tradition” into a functioning 
state (Jhazbhay, 2009:51). 
2.7.5 Success Stories on conflict Transformation Initiatives 
Constitutionally, the Somali constitution recognized the Somaliland Guurti, or House of 
Elders, which represents the major clans.  It also ensures balance within the clan system. As 
cited in the Somaliland constitution, the Somaliland Guurti system is responsible for  
“review (of) the legislation passed by the House of Representatives before it is 
forwarded to the President; and shall have special responsibility for passing laws 





The constitution gives significant power to clan elders. Walls (2009) indicated that “In 1993, 
as part of the overall strategy of decentralization of the Somaliland government, the president 
deferred to the Guurti to assume responsibility for mediating disputes between the 
government and opposition groups” (Walls, 2009: 383). Walls (2009) further pointed out 
that, “In taking this action, he effectively transferred responsibility for negotiating a transition 
to civilian government, to a traditionally based civilian Guurti” (Walls, 2009: 383).  
 
The ceding of executive power to the Guurti system show cased clans that the Somaliland 
government was not going to be a system similar to previous Somali regimes. 
Kaplan (2008) noted that,  
“Somaliland’s evolution shows that states should look inward for their resources and 
institutional models and adopt political structures and processes that reflect the 
history, complexity, and particularity of their peoples and environments” (Kaplan, 
2008: 144). 
Somaliland returned to its independence after the collapse of the government in 1991. 
According to Walls (2009), this came about “after the conference at Burao where clan 
representatives met in the centre of Isaaq Somaliland to agree on six resolutions to bring an 
end to the conflict in northern Somalia with separate administration from Mogadishu” (Walls, 
2009:379).  After the Burao conference, Inter-clan conflict was resolved successfully  by 
representatives of clan elders from different conflicting groups, substantiating the fact that 
conflict transformation was successful and achievable at inter-clan level. Byrne (2013) states 
that  “It is notable that the principle of ‘forgetting’ grievances rather than calculating and 
enforcing compensation payments was applied in each of the Somaliland peace-building 
processes” (Byrne, 2013:121).  
There, It is important to note the key lesson or direction reconciliation takes in the case of 
Somaliland. While this seems successful, clan reconciliation failed in other parts of Somalia 
and it is mostly because parties to the reconciliation conferences lack the intent to achieve 




 “In a very real sense, the clan elders have served to guarantee peace and security in 
Somaliland in that, they are the nation’s ultimate fallback as an ‘insurance policy’ against 
descent into anarchy” (Jhazbhay, 2009:58).  
 Biggar (2002) also agree that the clan leaders in this example “were also able to create a 
viable agreement that favours all sides to the conflict politically” (Biggar (2002:168). 
Localised systems of governance have, in some places and at some points in time, provided a 
surprising degree of stability, despite the absence of the state. Menkhaus (2000) noted:  
 
“Notwithstanding the general perception of Somalia as “anarchic”, basic law and 
order is in fact the norm in most locations… much of the Somali countryside - 
especially Somaliland, Puntland, and pockets of southern Somalia - is safer for local 
residents than is the case in neighbouring countries. There are, to be sure, shifting 
zones of very dangerous banditry and criminality in places like Jowhar, the lower 
Jubba valley, and parts of Mogadishu. It is also true that both Somali nationals and 
foreigners associated with an international organization or a profitable business are 
frequent targets of kidnapping for ransom, especially in Mogadishu. But it is 
important not to confuse the security problems of international aid agencies with 
security problems for average residents’’ (Menkhaus, 2000: 9) 
 
For instance, UNOSOM’s withdrawal in March 1995 did not, as many feared, result in a 
return to whole-scale extreme fighting. Violent conflicts did continue after, but armed clashes 
became shorter, more localized, and was generally minimized (Philip, 2005:551). Doornbos 
(2001) mentioned that the reasons for this was that “UN military intervention had helped to 
curtail the intense conflict between the major factions, and those factions and clans that had 
gained traction during the first years focused on consolidating their gains” (Doornbos, 2001: 
192). Also, the community-based peace processes study done in south-central Somalia by 
Interpeace and Center for Research and Dialogue (2008) highlighted that “UNOSOM 
supported a number of local peace initiatives, by providing good offices and mediation 
support. Some of which had a positive impact.  One of such UNOSOM supported regional 
initiative was in Kismayo in 1994, involving the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Somali 
Patriotic Movement (SPM)  Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and representatives 
of nineteen clans from Middle and Lower Jubba regions (with the exception of the Absame 
41 
 
sub-clan which signed the agreement later)” (Center for Research and Diologue, 2008:18). A 
significant example of a successful localised reconciliation process at regional level is the 
Wajid Peace Conference in 2006, through which the agreement reached between two political 
factions concerned led to social reconciliation between the clans, with positive implications 
for the national process. (Center for Research and Dialogue, 2008: 19). 
 
Another likely success story is the Somali National Reconciliation Conference hosted by 
Kenya from October 2002 to late 2004. It represented the first sustained effort by regional 
states (under the aegis of IGAD) to broker peace in Somalia, by reconciling the Transitional 
National Government (TNG) and the opposition SRRC. Unlike many of the past conference, 
it was designed to address real conflict issues rather than focus exclusively on power-sharing 
deals (Tavolato, 2004:12). The talks began in the town of Eldoret before being relocated in 
February 2003 to Mbagathi, outside Kenya’s capital Nairobi – making it known as “the 
Mbagathi process”. The process culminated in the endorsement of a Transitional Federal 
Charter, the creation of Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and the election of Abdullahi 
Yusuf Ahmed as transitional president, which ushered in the second phase of the transitional 
arrangements in 2004, including ‘’the establishment of security, and drafting of a 
constitution’’(Andrews, 2013: 2). Though this peace process might not achieve the desired 
outcome, it does lay the foundation for state-building.  
 
2.8 Theoretical Framework  
This research utilized both John Paul Lederach’s and Johan Galtung’s conflict transformation 
ideas. Conflict transformation according to the Berghof glossary “is still a relatively new and 
distinct term in the global discourse on conflict and peace-building. Conflict transformation 
views the existence of conflicts as a valuably indispensable part of social change and 
development, but does not see violence as inevitable in the relations and interaction between 
conflicting parties” (Berghof Glossary, 2012: 7). Further, the Berghof Foundation asserts that 
“Conflict transformation does not see the resolution of conflicts as the most important or 
ultimate goal of engagement. Instead, it aims to establish constructive relations among the 
conflicting actors, and helps create the structures that are needed for lasting peace” (Berghof 
Foundation, 2012: 7). Korpen et al, (2008) explains how conflict transformation can create 
lasting peace. He noted that “Conflict transformation does so by influencing the root causes 
of conflicts in such a way that sustainable non-violent strategies can prevail. Secondly, the 
concept of conflict transformation builds on a systemic and inclusive approach to conflicts 
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which takes account of their interdependent dimensions, and dynamic nature. This 
perspective impacts on the manner in which, common sense are used to define and describe 
phenomena of social change and transformation” (Korpen, et al, 2008: 12). In the field of 
conflict transformation, precise terminology can help to better understand the root causes and 
the nature of conflicts. Korpen et al, (2008) indicated that “It can also help in shaping 
theoretical and conceptual approaches to peace, and in developing appropriate political and 
social strategies” (Korpen, et al, 2008: 12). The theoretical framework will focus more on 
understanding conflict transformation as it relates to the relevance of this study.  
 
In navigating the concept of conflict transformation, Diana (2010) put forward that “Conflict 
transformation is best described as a complex process of constructively changing 
relationships, attitudes, behavior, interests and discourses in violence-prone conflict settings. 
Importantly, it also addresses underlying structures, cultures and institutions that encourage 
and condition violent political and social conflict’’ (Diana, 2010: 22). Diana (2010) also 
noted that “the term is used in the works of several authors in peace and conflict studies for 
example, Adam Curle, Johan Galtung, Louis Kriesberg, Kumar Rupesinghe, Raimo 
Vayrynen, among others. However, it has been elaborated most specifically in the works of 
John Paul Lederach and Diana Francis” (Diana, 2010: 22). Dudouet (2011) expound on the 
concept further, by indicating that “It is a multidimensional, non-linear and unpredictable 
process involving many different actors in moving from latent and overt violence to structural 
and cultural peace” (Dudouet, 2011: 237-264). Hunt, (1994) noted that Conflict 
Transformation speaks specifically to situations of protracted and asymmetric conflict 
involving social justice issues. As such, “In protracted settings, the theory is an approach that 
calls for long-term engagement and political skill” (Hunt, 1994: 216). He also noted that “this 
theory is a conceptualization from the field in order to make it more relevant to contemporary 
asymmetric conflicts” (Hunt, 1994: 216). Asymmetric conflict is a vivid characteristic of 
contemporary armed conflict. It is marked by inequalities of power and status, violence, and 
often protracted in nature (GeiB, 2006: 757).  The theory of conflict transformation draws its 
analogy from other conflict management theories that are also building blocks to it. Since 
attitudes and behavior changed immensely in a transformational process during conflict, 
(Bodtker and Jameson, 2009) the theory proposed the same change in behavior after armed 
conflict (Galtung, 1996: 70-126). Conflict transformation attempts to address incompatibility 
which arises between parties, by eliminating the conflict through transcending the 
contradiction, compromise, and by associating or disassociating with actors (Galtung 1996: 
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116). Conflict transformation is also related to Azer’s work (1990) on protracted social 
conflict. Azer’s work focused on the genesis and maintenance of protracted conflict. 
According to Azer’s (1990) work, the theory of protracted social conflict traces the 
“formation of protracted conflict which ranges from the historical context, the denial of basic 
human needs of access, identity and security, as well as through the roles played out by 
different entities” (Azer, 1990: 20 - 90).  
 
Conflict transformation also involves a range of actors with different strategies but one 
objective. Actors usually involved in conflict transformation are divided into four groups.  
- “States and inter-governmental organizations 
- Development and humanitarian organizations  
- International NGOs concerned with conflict prevention and transformation 
- Parties to the conflict and other relevant groups within the affected societies” (Miall, 
2004:12) 
For Somalia, the four major categories of actors above are fully operational, each relevant, 
and contributing or playing out differently in the country. In as much as all actors are playing 
an important role, “state and international actors are among the most influential of the actors” 
(Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 21). This means that in Somalia, the actors are 
quite important in influencing all initiatives for transforming the conflict. Since conflict 
interplays around global, regional, and societal conflict parties, conflict transformation theory 
proposes the mapping of these actors and their involvement as crucial to peace-building 
(Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 21). For instance, at the global level, the most 
common cause of conflict is the post-colonial legacy. At the regional level, the most common 
cause of conflict is spill-overs. At the state or societal level, ethnicity is among the known 
cause. At the level of conflicting parties, disagreement between groups within the state is a 
major cause (Scherrer, 1994: 74). What is important here is the context and the relationship 
between the actors of a conflict. In an effort to transform conflict, interaction with the society 
and among these groups is key (Galtung, 1996: 212). During this period of conflict 
transformation in Somalia, “poor relationships between clans or groups may pose a great 
threat to escalating the conflict, and will remain a major hindrance to peace-building efforts 
even after the violence is over” (Dabiel, T. et all 2009). The theory of conflict transformation 
emphasizes a careful consideration in taking heed of the needs of all conflicting parties for a 
successful peace-building effort (Diamond, 1994: 3). Conflict transformation takes place in 
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different forms. These include context transformation, structural transformation, actor 
transformation, issue transformation and personal transformations (Mitchelle, 2000: 1-23). 
Mitchelle (2000) demonstrated that context transformation speaks to “changes in the context 
of conflict that can change each party’s perception of the conflict situation, as well as their 
motives. Structural transformation speaks to the structure of the conflict; the set of actors, 
their issues, incompatible goals and relationships to the society; economy and state within 
which conflict is embedded” (Mitchelle, 2000: 1-23).  Lederach (1995) indicated that 
“Conflict Transformation proposes that asymmetric conflict can only be transformed with 
balanced and incontestable relationships” (Lederach, 1995: 12). Issue transformation 
concerns the reformulation of positions maintains by parties to a conflict. Mitchelle (2000) 
expound that “this is very important for parties to redefine or reframe those positions in order 
to reach compromises or resolutions” (Mitchelle, 2000: 1-23). Another key type of conflict 
transformation is Actor Transformation. (Holtzman, et al 1998) explains that Actor 
transformation speaks to the necessity of “actors to change their goals or alter their general 
approach to conflict as and when necessary to support conflict transformation processes” 
(Holtzman, Elwan and Scott, 1998: 22). While actor transformation is very important, 
personal transformation is crucial to capture the will or commitment of an individual or 
leaders or group to make a relevant decision that may be essential to transforming the conflict 
(Curle, 1987). Further to these assertions, Burton 1996: 20 identifies several principles which 
form the backbone of a conflict transformation process: 
 Conflict should not be regarded as an isolated event that can be resolved or managed 
but as an integral part of society’s on-going evolution and development. 
 Conflicts should not be understood sorely as an inherently negative and destructive 
occurrence but rather, as a potentially positive and productive force of change if 
harnessed constructively. 
 Conflict transformation goes beyond merely seeking to contain and manage conflict, 
it instead seek to transform root causes of a particular conflict. 
 Conflict transformation is a long term gradual and complex process requiring 
sustained engagement and interaction. 
 Conflict transformation is not just an approach and set of techniques but a way of 
thinking about and understanding conflict itself. 




In explaining the evolution of the practice of conflict transformation, Mitchelle, (1994) 
unfold that the practice of conflict transformation theory “has developed over the past decade. 
As a new approach, it can be differentiated from conflict management and conflict resolution, 
although they all shared similar school of thought” (Mitchelle, 1994: 136). “Conflict 
transformation is thus a comprehensive approach, addressing a range of dimensions (micro to 
macro issues, local to global levels, grassroots to elite actors, and short-term to long term). It 
aims to develop capacity, and to support structural change, rather than to facilitate outcomes 
or deliver settlements. It seeks to engage with conflict, which usually extend beyond the site 
of fighting (Berghof Glossary, 2012). Though the theory is a promising one, it lacks an 
adequate explanation to capture the emerging threats to conflicts, and the formation of new 
actors and new issues. Thus the theory needs to be broadened (Berghof Handbook Dialogue 
No 6, 2013).  
 
2.8.1 Agents of Conflict Transformation 
Conflict transformation speaks to approaches that seek to encourage wider social change 
through transforming the antagonistic relationship between the parties to the conflict. Based 
on the understanding that conflicts do not simply occur due to incompatible interests and 
unmet needs, it situates them in the historically and socially defined relations between the 
collective identities of the parties to the conflict (Zistel, 2008). In any setting of protracted 
conflict, there are agents of violent change or resistance but also agents of peaceful change. 
Any process of conflict transformation must find and connect the drivers of peaceful change, 
in which Francis (2002) elaborated as constituency building (Francis, 2002:33).  It has 
become clear that “conflict transformation efforts need actors such as, governments and non-
state actors; women and men; conflict parties and peace envoys” (Mitchell, 1993: 147). 
Irrespective of the need for external actors to serve as agents of transformation, Berghof 
(2012) reminds practitioners to be “mindful that peace is made from within the society in 
conflict rather than by external experts and interveners, even when the latter may bring much 
needed and welcome ideas and support” (Berghof Glossary, 2012: 7). In recognition of the 
importance of culture as a means of generating and resolving conflicts in conflict 
transformation, traditional approaches to terminating conflicts have become increasingly 
popular in contemporary reconciliation. If effective, they provide people affected by violent 
conflict with the means to solve their own problems. Therefore, traditional practice highlights 
the need and relevance of the socio-political community to assert itself, its identity and its 
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control of its norms in a conflict setting, not necessarily to be seen as key breakers of 
violence (Museveni, 1997: 58).  
 
2.8.2 Reflection of Conflict Transformation in Somalia’s State-building 
Somalia has seen tremendous international support to bring an end to the conflict through a 
series of consultative meetings between different groups in the Somali parliament. In the past, 
various strong individuals attempted to establish a unified government but the peace 
processes were all flawed by the lack of trust with no relationship to bind agreements. The 
peace processes often lacks a bottom-up and clan legitimized approach where traditional 
authorities could have made a huge difference. Ahmed & Green (1999) highlighted that 
“unlike the internationally backed attempts at state building, conflict resolution processes in 
the north has always been the responsibility of elders who have authority to represent their 
clans” (Ahmed & Green, 1999:123). The earlier Somali transitional federal government that 
was formed were also not respecting rule of law in their state building efforts. They see it as a 
western phenomenon. There were complaints of mismanagement of public funds, which 
largely contributed to destroying the already managed relationship which has constrained 
Somalia’s unity (Leeson, 2007). Since Somalia’s state building efforts were driven by 
western approach, the approach did not place much emphasis on transforming relationships at 
clan or local level for a long time (Ahmed & Green, 1999). 
 
Therefore, the most influential arm of the local community hardly trusts the transitional 
governments in place. They were basically seen as western oriented.  Whilst traditional 
communities or clan rivalry are often seen as a major cause of the conflict, they can also be a 
major player in Somalia’s state-building processes if conflict transformation is embedded 
with a focus on transforming clan rivalry. Martin Doornbos states, “the issue is neither the 
provisional government nor the parliament that has been recognized by a number of 
important political groups and stakeholders” (Doornbos, 1990:.93).  
 
Moreover, despite the presence of AMISOM and the international support to state building in 
Somalia, conflict transformation should be at the centre of these operations.  A situation 
where armed groups representing clans would need to have a rethink of the true meaning of 
Somalia’s rich culture, and how trusting and accepting one another as family would benefit 
everyone despite the atrocities that have been committed by  certain sect. Byrne (2013),  
believes that “a top down solution does give room for such to happen in Somalia, noting that 
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top down institutions cannot be sensitive to the requirements and structures of society (Byrne, 
2013:122).  In reality, conflict transformation is more likely to bridge social contrast between 
state and citizen than a state-building process that does little in bridging this gap (Leonard & 
Samantar, 2011). In realizing the importance of inclusivity, AMISOM adopted a series of 
conflict transformation approaches to its implementation in the form of activities that fits into 
the mission’s mandate. It recognized that “clan elders have been the catalysts for ending 
violence between clans and sub-clans and providing security for and legitimacy to the 
government in Somaliland. As such, elders, merchants, women’s groups and other genuine 
stakeholders, are participating in workshops and seminars organized by AMISOM as 
compared to latter years when there were not included (AMISOM, 2014). For example, 
Upsall, (2014) noted that “Somaliland succeeded with the approach where the former TFG 
failed. Currently, Somaliland has a constitution, a functioning representative government and 
security forces which protect a defined territory. The population of Somaliland recognizes the 
government as legitimate and has sent emissaries to foreign capitals, even if those same 
foreign capitals do not officially recognize the existence of Somaliland for political reasons” 
(Upsall, 2014: 3). 
 
Similarly, IGAD authorized a bottom-up approach that is inclusive of elders, merchants, 
women’s groups and other genuine stakeholders who could participate in Somalia’s peace 
process (IGAD, 2001: 41). This follows on from its proposal to include grassroots 
organizations in Somali peace processes. Though the Arta conference did not have a 
successful impact, its flaws highlight the essence and positive impact a dedicated and focused 
conflict transformation effort may bring if applied earnestly (Interpeace, 2009:49). 
 
2.8.3 The Relevance of Conflict Transformation Theory to the Research 
The theory of conflict transformation ideally proposed the relevance of addressing root 
causes as the baseline to achieve sustainable peace, and avoid a relapse into violent conflict. 
While this assertion forms the basis of the arguments in this research, it also means that for 
Somalia, the root causes of the conflict would need to be addressed to avoid recurring 
conflict, and further prevent the waste of resources that have been used to bring stability to 
the country. Ideally, conflict transformation theory aim is for a change in the fundamental 
relationships, social structures and contextual conditions that give rise to the conflict. 
Considering the causes of the conflict in Somalia, It may be difficult to resolve conflicts 
between parties using diplomacy for instance when issues relating to the conflict concern 
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fundamental asymmetries, such as dominance over minorities by majorities, or similar power 
relations between groups stratified by class, ethnicity or beliefs (Miall, 2004). While conflict 
resolution is useful, it may be problematic for a non-western context where sustainable 
outcomes of negotiations cannot be guaranteed due to the potential slip in the rule of law. The 
unpredictability of this situation makes conflict transformation a better option for Somalia. In 
contrast, approaches to conflict transformation expound a little bit further, in that they 
recognize that conflicts occurred not only through incompatible goals and unequal structures, 
but that these are outcomes of historical processes which define the identities of the parties 
involved, and which calls for more substantial social change (Reimann, 2004: 13) as 
suggested in this research on AMISOMs’ contributions. 
 
When Somalia’s armed extremist groups resort to violent repression and rebellion as a 
strategy to send a message, conflict can be very destructive. According to Galtung, (1996), 
“this destructive conflict revolves around a distorted pattern of governance, and a militarized 
form of politics, which in turn leads to the further denial of basic needs. This has resulted into 
a protracted cycle of institutional deformation and destructive conflict” (Galtung 1996: 90).   
With the existence of sufficient capacity in governance and society; and a supportive 
international environment, the state and its warring parties may have resorted to political 
confrontation, which is a pattern of constructive conflict that promotes decision-making 
capacity, strengthens autonomous development, and sustains civil rather than military politics 
(Lederach, 1995: 201-22). This will gradually promote access to basic needs. Constructive 
conflict reaction in Somalia is gradually paving the way to address entrenched patterns of 
conflict, and reveal the actual pillars that keep fuelling or aiding the conflict through conflict 
transformation.  Conflict transformation thus goes beyond structural and behavioral 
justifications, but Vayrynen (1991) suggests how “patterns of conflict interact with satisfying 
the interest of all” (Vayrynen, 1991: 4). Conflict transformation emphasized the importance 
of studying how conflicts are transformed within society. Such study needs careful analysis 
of the situation, and the dynamics of anything that influences peace in that environment 
(Vayrynen, 1991: 4). While Mitchelle (2000) and Vayrynen (1991) proposed four types of 
conflict transformation approaches may be useful to employ in the Somali conflict 
(Vayrynen, 1991: 5), Rupesinghe (1995,1998) argument for a multi-track conflict 
transformation intervention is  much more context specific to the Somali conflict. 
Rupesinghe’s multi-track approach to conflict transformation proposes “the building of peace 
constituencies at the grassroots level, and the civil society level, including also creating peace 
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alliances with any groups that are able to bring about change” (Rupesinghe, 1995: 8). In the 
case of Somalia, the clans could be such groups (Rupesinghe, 1995: 8).  Thus, Rupesinghe  
(1995) and Vayrnen (1991) idea of conflict transformation forms a fine pattern that can be 
utilized and analysed to address some of the issues posing a great challenge to the 
stabilization of Somalia. One key advantage of the theory is that, it provides the research with 
a broader perspective to understand how the Somali conflict can be best resolved. Vayrnen 
(1999) envisaged this view also. Conflict transformation requires a process training that 
envisions cultural knowledge as a key resource in both the creation and development of 
models appropriate to a given setting (Lederach, 1995: 10). Conflict transformation is a long 
process inspired by peace, justice, truth and mercy (Lederach’s 1997). It speaks to key 
dimensions of changing processes that are required in a protracted social, political and 
religious conflict to attain cultural universality. This changing process ranges from “personal, 
structural, relational, and cultural aspects of the conflict” (Lederach, 1995: 68).  Generally, 
the theory of conflict transformation proposes a comprehensive peace process, which should 
address all aspects of a conflict.  
 
2.9.1 Conclusion 
In an attempt to reunify Somaliland, history on reconciliation has shown that Inter-clan 
dialogue can build the pillars of peace. These inter-clan dialogues are epitome of the agents 
of change identified under the theoretical framework of this chapter. After the fall of Siad 
Barre, most of the northern part of Somalia came under the control of the Somali National 
Movement (SNM). Inter-clan dialogue was then facilitated to encourage clans that fell within 
the minority (Farah & Lewis, 1997). In the case of Somaliland, peace-building is celebrated 
mainly because the building of peace started at the grassroots level, where meetings between 
clans has a unanimous support for a particular political entity – the SNM, which was key in 
bringing down the one time Somali dictator – Mohamed Siad Barre (Tahir, 2013: 1).  For the 
larger parts of Somalia, Weber (2008) identified few failed attempts, as well as possible 
obstacles for state-building in Somalia. These include, imposed government, marginalization, 
and support for one faction over another (Weber A, 2008: 1). The direction in which the 
larger Somalia develops will depend partly on the strategies applied to its state-building 
process. A bottom-up approach with the intension to transform and build relationships, 
institutions, civil society, political parties and leadership is a possible strategy that could 
work. The continuous focus on the above, and the effort to address any inequality or 
disagreement among groups will likely help to stabilize and unite Somalia. 
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                                                        Chapter Three 
                                 Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter consists of the research methodology and contextualizes the history of Somalia. 
It provides a detailed account of Somalia’s geographic characteristics – its people, religion, 
and trade history. It also analyses colonial occupation, and its effects on the socio-political 
structure of the state. It also details the background of the conflict under the leadership of 
Major General Mohamed Said Barre, and the formation of different political organizations or 
alliances. This information is very important to understand the nature of the conflict between 
individuals, clans and warlords. The chapter also sheds light on the historical background of 
dominant Somali warring factions to understand their initial motives and purposes as opposed 
to contemporary times. The relevance of this is to capture the underlying interest of these 
factions, and the reasons for their transformation and persistent fighting. This chapter looks at 
the events that happened during the first phase of the formation of the Somali TFG, and the 
dynamics of power play that further complicated the peace process, leading to the 
intervention of African regional forces (IGASOM and AMISOM). The chapter also examines 
the current political, humanitarian and security situation to assess progress made by the 
federal government with support from AMISOM in decentralization, and the promotion of 
reconciliation, development and protection of the Somali community.  
 
3.2 Research Methodology 
A research methodology includes the research designs, population and sample, data 
collection procedures, data analysis procedures and measurement of variables. The sample of 
individuals consisted of 12 AMISOM personnel, and 8 practitioners and experts selected 
from NGOs supporting AMISOMs operations. This study utilized a qualitative research 
method. Qualitative research is aimed at gaining a deep understanding of a specific 
organization or event, rather than surface description of a large sample of a population. It is 
aimed at providing an explicit rendering of the structure, order, and broad patterns found 
among a group of participants. It is also called ethnomethodology or field research. It 
generates data about human groups in social settings.  
Qualitative research does not introduce treatments or manipulate variables, or impose the 
researcher's operational definitions of variables on the participants. Rather, it lets the meaning 
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emerge from the participants. It is more flexible in that it can adjust to any setting. One 
common advantage of qualitative research is that concepts, data collection tools, and data 
collection methods can be adjusted as the research progresses.  
Qualitative research aims to get a better understanding through first-hand experience, truthful 
reporting, and quotations of actual conversations. It aims to understand how the participants 
derive meaning from their surroundings, and how their meaning influences their behaviour 
(Mugenda, 2003). Qualitative research is characterised by its aims, which relate to 
understanding some aspect of social life, and its methods which (in general) generate words, 
rather than numbers, as data for analysis. In situations where little is known, it is often better 
to start with qualitative methods (interviews, focus groups, etc) in all behavioural research. It 
can help with generating hypotheses that can then be tested by quantitative methods. For 
instance, in an area where we had no idea what kinds of issue were acting as barriers to 
peace, it would be difficult to design a survey to cover the main factors (Patton, 2002). 
Qualitative methods generally aim to understand the experiences and attitudes of individual 
and groups in a particular community.  
 
These methods aim to answer questions about the ‘what’, ‘how’ or ‘why’ of a phenomenon 
rather than ‘how many’ or ‘how much’, which are answered by quantitative methods. If the 
aim is to understand how a community or individuals within it perceive a particular issue, 
then qualitative methods are often appropriate. Qualitative research is about finding out not 
just what people think, but why they think it. It’s about getting people to talk about their 
opinions so one can understand their motivations and feelings. Face-to-face interviews and 
group discussions are the best way to get this kind of in-depth feedback. Qualitative research 
can be valuable when you are developing new products or coming up with new 
recommendations for a particular initiative Qualitative research can also uses observation as a 
data collection method. Observation is the selection and recording of behaviours of people in 
their environment. Observation is useful for generating in-depth descriptions of organizations 
or events, for obtaining information that is otherwise inaccessible, and for conducting 
research when other methods are inadequate.  
 
This research focused on two conceptual and empirical findings. First, being that the conflict 
in Somalia has lasted for decades and the possibility of the continuation of violence is high 
(Elmi, 2010:35), it is important to research an approach that can be best utilized to bring 
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stability to Somalia.  Secondly, whereas peace agreements and PSOs options seems 
challenging in ending the conflict, it is important to find out how conflict transformation 
efforts can be employed alongside AMISOM’s PSOs to bring stability in Somalia. For 
example, the first empirical finding assessed the extent to which AMISOM has contributed to 
Somalia’s conflict transformation. There has been many activities undertaken by the mission, 
some often beyond the framework of the current mandate to contribute to the peace. From 
these findings, the research analysed whether AMISOMs approaches are best placed to 
support conflict transformation efforts in Somalia or whether there is a need for other options 
or emphasis on a particular area of support.   The second conceptual and empirical findings 
that this research attempted to look at how conflict transformation could work effectively 
alongside the current mandate of AMISOM. Based on the findings above, the mission does 
not have a specific mandate for conflict transformation (AMISOM, 2014), but rather its 
current mandate is geared towards a key goal of transforming the conflict in Somalia.  Many 
see the operations of AMISOM as a peace enforcement operation; however, at the strategic 
level of the mission management structure, it is clear that the mission is a peace support 
operation which encompasses peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping and peace-building 
(Bruton, EB 2014:40). PSOs thus give room for broader conflict transformation engagements. 
 
The research used two main methods for analysis: 
Secondary data: The research utilized qualitative analysis, and thus makes use of interviews, 
workshop reports, text books, online articles, news update, website information, 
organizational publications, UN resolutions, and AU communiqués. In summary, primary and 
secondary sources were utilized, to provide content analysis, and textual criticism from 
historical studies. Moreover, secondary data is used to clarify and understand the Somalia 
Administrative and government structures.  For, example, Somalia has 18 administrative 
regions (plural – NA, singular – gobolka). These include: Awdal, Bakool, Banaadir, Bari, 
Bay, Galguduud, Gedo, Hiiran, Jubbada Dhexe (Middle Jubba, Jubbada Hoose (Lower 
Jubba), Mudug, Nugaal, Sanaag, Shabeellaha Dhexe (Middle Shabeelle), Shabellaha Hoose 
(Lower Shabeela), Sool, Togdheer, and Woqooyi Galbeed (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2015). Somalia’s government is composed of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
branches. The Executive consisted of the chief of state, head of government, and a cabinet. 
The Legislature is composed of a bi-cameral National Parliament consisting of the house of 
the people of the federal parliament – a 275 seats, elected by the Somali citizens, and the 
upper house of the federal parliament – a 54 seats, elected by people of the federal member 
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states; while the Judiciary consist of 5 judges including the chief judge and deputy chief 
judge. However, under the terms of the 2004 Transitional National Charter (TNC), a supreme 
court based in Mogadishu and an appeal court were established; yet most regions have 
reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, either secular traditional Somali customary law, 
or sharia Islamic law. Other sub-ordinate courts are:  federal member state level courts; 
military courts; and sharia (Islamic) courts (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). 
 
Primary data: Data collection consisted of key informant interviews (KIIs) which was 
administered to 20 peace and conflict practitioners via email, phone calls and face to face 
meetings. The informant interviewees included those working within the mission area, and 
are familiar with the work of AMISOM, and those personnel whose institutions (eg. The 
African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Dispute (ACCORD), the Kofi Annan 
International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC), the Institute for Security Studies 
(ISS), and the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) are working closely 
with AMISOM.  The information obtained from the respondents are mostly consistent with 
those obtain from the desk top research conducted during the literature review. It verifies 
variables that are linked to the desktop findings on the causes of the Somali conflict, the 
impact of the conflict and the security gain made by AMISOM in Somalia. Thus, it enhances 
reliability and sustainability of the data collected in this research. 
 
The data obtained from the respondents helps verify how the theory used to support the 
research analysis, is relevant to the research. The responses help to analyse the relevant data 
that helps the research to meet its objectives.  The key information interviews conducted 
helps to shape the ideas and perceptions of the information gather to culminate it into a very 
good findings and recommendations.  
 
How is qualitative research utilized in this research? 
The research used a combination of both primary and secondary methods of data collection to 
achieve a comprehensive quality of the information gathered. The purpose of conducting 
research is geared towards developing and evaluating concepts and theories, Zikmud (1986). 
This research utilized qualitative analysis by conducting an extensive review of several 
existing literatures on the history of Somalia, the nature of the Somali conflict, the root 
causes of the conflict, the history of past attempt to stabilize Somalia and the theory that best 
support the argument of the research.  The research also utilized interview tools such as 
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questionnaire, and observation to gather relevant opinion from practitioners working on peace 
and security issues in Somalia. The questionnaires were designed to get an in-depth 
understanding of the situation of Somalia, the work of AMISOM, the support of the FGS and 
obtain relevant information on the successes and challenges AMISOM faces in transforming 
the conflict in Somalia. The questionnaire consisted of 8 questions, which encouraged 
respondents to think and come up with relevant possible recommendations to improve the 
existing work of AMISOM. The questionnaire was administered to AMISOM personnel, AU 
personnel and partner institutions that supports the work of AMISOM.  
 
3.2.1 Research Design 
Research design basically includes the collection, measurement and analysis of data. They 
further state that qualitative research is a descriptive, non-numerical way to collect and 
interpret information; it investigates how people react, work, live and manage their daily 
lives.  Descriptive designs are used in preliminary and explanatory studies to allow the 
researcher to gather information, summarize, present and interpret it for the purpose of 




 The researcher chose a descriptive research design because it allowed for analysis of 
different variables and at the same time allowed the researcher to evaluate the extent to which 
AMISOM has contributed to Somalia’s conflict transformation. Thematic areas in which 
AMISOM has contributed to, such as security, support to the extension of state authority, 
management of disengaged fighters, humanitarian assistance and capacity building were 
identified and analysed to see how far AMISOM has successes in these areas  
 
3.2.2 Sample Size 
Qualitative research typically starts with a specific group, type of individual, event, or 
process. In this sense, the research choses specific individuals within the AMISOM 
organizational structure who have experience in the operations of AMISOM in Somalia. 
These individuals identified and selected for the research have an in-depth understanding of 
peace and security issues, and in particular in specific areas the mission has had success in. 
These areas include governance, security sector reform and the protection of civilians.   Since 
the research required individuals with an in-depth understanding of the activities of 
AMISOM in Somalia, there are many individuals working in and out of the mission area who 
will be able to provide such information. However, it will not be possible to interview every 
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one of these individuals. Therefore, 20 individuals were selected within and outside 
AMISOM, who had in-depth understanding of the operation of AMISOM and the conflict in 
Somalia.  Therefore, 20 individuals were selected for interviews. The sample of individuals 
consisted of 12 AMISOM Personnel, and 8 practitioners and experts selected from NGOs 
supporting AMISOMs operations in Somalia.   
 
3.3.3 Research Instrument 
The researcher developed a semi structured Interview questionnaire (SIQ) which sought 
information related to the causes of the conflict, the key focus of AMISOM in contributing to 
peace in Somalia, the aspects of AMISOMs mandate that speaks towards the missions role in 
addressing the conflict, and the major contribution of the mission in stabilizing the country,  
The questionnaire focuses on open ended questions that will give insight on the themes the 
questionnaire seeks to achieve.  It also enabled the researcher to interact more with the 
respondents and evaluate the information given whether reliable or not. All the respondents 
agreed to be interviewed on a voluntary basis. 
3.3.4 Data Collection Procedure 
The procedure included seeking consent from participants before conducting interviews. 
Primary data was obtained from field research using interviews, conducted via phone calls, 
emails and face to face interviews. The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured 
questionnaire. This method involved the use of closed and open ended questions. The 
questionnaire was divided into four sections, which addressed the research objectives. This 
was considered sufficient because participants were purposively selected on their experiences 
in the Somali conflict, and in the work of the mission. This group was considered 
homogenous to provide information on the role of AMISOM in Somalia’s conflict 
transformation. For the purpose of confidentiality and anonymity, codes were used to conceal 
the identities of the participants as requested by the interviewees. While the secondary data 
was gathered from books, reports, journals, newspapers, publications, magazines and online 
sources. 
3.3.5 Ethical Considerations  
Ethics and norms governing humans play a critical role in maintaining harmony in the 
society. It is the responsibility of the researcher to assess the possibility of harm to research 
participants and minimize the same Ferrel & Fraedrich, (2008). 
The main Ethical Considerations included: -  
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1. Informed Consent – The questionnaire had a separate informed consent explanation 
which had the options of; not to participate if not willing or to withdraw the participation 
any time without loss of benefits in appendix 2. 
2. Confidentiality – All questionnaires were coded to enhance confidentiality.  
3.3.6 Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
The respondents were approached for informed consent. All those who declined consent or 
withdraw their consent were excluded. 
3.3.7 Data Analysis Procedure 
Data analysis is the process of structuring and giving meaning to the information collected. 
The research presents its findings by identifying key areas AMISOM has contributed in 
transforming the conflict in Somalia. It utilized a narrative analysis to ascertain whether 


























 4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an in-depth contextual background on the history of Somalia looking at 
brief background on Somalia’s dominant armed groups, their objectives, and the United 
Nations, African Union (AU) and Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
interventions in an attempt to bring stability to the country in the 1990s.  
 
4.2 Brief History and Background to the Conflict in Somalia 
In the early 1990s when the Soviet Union disintegrated, many people expected that peace in a 
unipolar world would prevail. Instead, many intra-state wars broke out in different parts of 
the globe. Different factions, identity groups and regions challenged existing states' 
monopoly over violence (Weiss, 1995:3). As a result, a number of states collapsed and many 
others to this day remain precipitously on the verge of failing. Liberia, Congo, Cambodia, 
Somalia, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia, are examples of states that experienced 
total collapse (Dallmeyer, 1996: 23). According to Lewis (2002), Somalia, is situated in the 
Horn of Africa, and lies along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. “It is surrounded by 
Djibouti in the northwest, Ethiopia in the west, and Kenya in the southwest” (Lewis, 2002:1).  
“Generally arid and barren, Somalia has two chief rivers, the Shebelle and the Juba” 
(Mohamed 2013:1). Somalia occupies a land area of about “246,199 sq miles (637,657 sq 
km). Somalia’s population as of 2011 estimates a total of 9,925,640 (growth rate: 1.6%); birth 
rate: 42.7/1000; infant mortality rate: 105.56/1000; life expectancy: 50.4” (Somalia 
Community, 2014). The dominant languages spoken are Somali (official), Arabic, English 
and Italian. The population of Somalia is mostly Muslim who follow the Shafi’i Suni school 
of thought (Mukhtar, 1995:1). It is comprised of clan families and major sub clans as 




Figure 5: Major Clan Family in Somalia 
According to Lewis (1965), the Somali- speaking people form one of the largest single ethnic 
blocks in Africa. Though they are sparsely located, they occupy a great territory covering 
almost 400, 000 square miles in the north-east, facing Arabia. Its stretches from the Awash 
valley in the north-west, through to the periphery of the Ethiopian highlands and the Gulf of 
Aden, and Indian Ocean coasts down to the Tana River in northern Kenya (Lewis, 1965:3). 
Today, this region is split unto four separate parts in the Horn of Africa. In Djibouti, Somalis 
make up about half the local population. In Ethiopia, there are about 1 million Somalis. In the 
Somali region itself, the strength of the Somalis is about 3, 250,000 (Lewis, 1965:2). Outside 
this region, Somalis are settled as traders and merchants in many of the towns and ports of 
East Africa, and the Middle East. For instance, Somalis are notable in Aden, the Gulf States 
and throughout Saudi Arabia. Afar off inland Somalia, the sea life-style of many Somalis has 
led to the establishment of small immigrant communities in the European ports of Marseilles, 
Naples, London, and Cardiff (Kusow, 1995:84). The Somali People are mostly Nomads or 
Pastoralists. In most cases, they are being forced by the exigencies of their demanding 
climate and environment to move with their cattle to distant places in an endless search for 
pasture and water (Lewis, 1965:2).  Lewis, further indicated that the northern coastal plains 
which extends from the lava-strewn deserts of the Republic of Djibouti alongside the Gulf of 
Aden shore to Cape Guarda-fui are mostly arid, which usually affects Nomads and 
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Pastoralists. For example, within this area, the annual rain fall exceeds three inches, and is 
concentrated in the comparatively cool months from October – January. Despite the heat and 
low rainfall, the run-off from the mountain ensures that water is usually easily obtainable 
only a few feet below the Gunabs sandy soil (Lewis, 1965:2). With these water resources, 
coupled with pastures which spring up after the autumn rains, this region provides the winter 
quarters for the most northerly Somali clans. Apart from the banks of the Jubba and Shabelle 
rivers, the only source of water is rain. Given these instances, Somalis usually share water as 
per the amount available at that time. In most cases, there is less water during the dry season, 
and that is when conflicts are likely to occur (Kusou, 1995:99).  
In the early 600s, Arab tribes established the sultanate of Adel on the Gulf of Aden coast. 
Some years later, the sultanate of Adel disintegrated into small states in the 1500s.  This led 
the Arab and Persian traders to establish trading posts from the 7th to the 10th century, 
“along the coast of present-day Somalia” (BBC News, 2011). According to BBC News 
(2011), “the Somali Nomadic tribes, who occupied the interior, occasionally began to push 
into Ethiopian territory. In the 16th century, Turkish rule extended to the northern coast, and 
the Sultans of Zanzibar gained control in the south” (BBC News, 2011) as they continued 
their trade. In 1840, The British annexed Aden, across the Red Sea in present-day Yemen. 
They began to trade with Somalis in present-day Somaliland, mostly in order to import meat 
for their sailors. This trade contact initiated the first interactions between the people of 
Somaliland and the Europeans. According to Alex (2008), after the British occupation of 
Aden in 1839, the Somali coast became its source of food (Alex, 2008). In 1860s, France 
acquired foothold on the Somali coast, later to become Djibouti. The French established a 
coal-mining station in 1862 at the site of Djibouti, and the Italians planted a settlement in 
Eritrea (Cassaneli, 1982:3).  Threatened by the growing European presence in the region, 
Egypt laid claim to Somaliland's coastal towns such as Seyla and Berbera in the early 1970s. 
In 1875, Egypt occupied towns on the Somali coast and parts of the interior for a longer 
period. Cassanelli (1982) noted that “Egypt, which for a time claimed Turkish rights in the 
area, was succeeded by Britain” (Cassanelli, 1982: 3). In 1887, Britain proclaimed a 
protectorate over Somaliland, while Anglo-French agreement defined the boundary between 
Somali possessions of the two countries in 1888. Following this, Italy set up a protectorate in 
central Somalia in 1889, later consolidated with territory in the south ceded by the Sultan of 
Zanzibar (BBC News, 2011). The British and an Italian protectorate occupied what is now 
Somalia by 1920. In 1925, territory east of the Jubba River was detached from Kenya to 
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become the westernmost part of the Italian protectorate. To further broaden the Italian 
protectorate, the English powers combined with Somali-speaking parts of Ethiopia to form a 
province of Italian East Africa in 1939 (BBC News, 2011).  
 
In 1940, the Italians occupied British Somaliland, while in 1941 the British occupied Italian 
Somalia.  According to Nelson, (1982), “the British ruled the entire area until 1941, with Italy 
returning in 1950 to serve as UN trustee for its former territory.  By 1960, Britain and Italy 
granted independence to their respective sectors, enabling British Somaliland and Italian 
Somalia to join as the United Republic of Somalia on July 1, 1960” (Nelson, 1982: 2). Aden 
Abdullah Osman Daar was then elected president. Foreign diplomacy was prevalent until 
“Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain in 1963 when the British granted the 
Somali-populated Northern Frontier District of Kenya to the Republic of Kenya” (Nelson, 
1982: 2). The diplomatic relations with Britain was restored in 1968 at a time when political 
tension with Ethiopia began to rise. Somalia was then plunged into a border dispute with 
Ethiopia, which affected the relationship of both countries. During that time, a democratic 
presidential election was held in 1967 which saw Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke emerge 
victorious over Aden Abdullah Osman Daar (Cerulli, 1957- 1964:3). On October 15, 1969, 
President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated, and the army seized power, 
dissolving the legislature and arresting all government leaders. The assassination was likely 
as a result of division and dissatisfaction within the SAF (Africa Watch Report 1990: 2). 
Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, who took over as president of a renamed Somali 
Democratic Republic, leaned heavily toward the USSR’s support to run the country. In 1970, 
Barre declared Somalia a socialist state, and nationalised the economy. Whilst Somalia was 
operating as a socialist state, it joined the Arab League in 1974 and suffered from a severe 
drought that caused widespread starvation (BBC News, 2011).  In 1977, Somalia openly 
backed rebels who invaded the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia - the Ogaden 
Desert, with the hope of claiming the territory. Somali forces were pushed out of Ogaden, 
with the help of Soviet advisers and Cuban troops. Barre in turn expelled Soviet advisers and 
solicited support from the US (Infoplease, 2005). According to the US Department of States 
(2013) estimates, “Somalia acknowledged defeat in an eight-month war against the 
Ethiopians that year, having lost much of its 32,000-man army and most of its tanks and 
planes” (US Department of State, 2013). From 1978 – 1981, opposition to Barre's regime 
began to emerge after he excluded members of the Mijertyn and Isaq clans from government 
positions, which were filled with people from his own Marehan clan. Barre’s dictatorship 
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favored members of his own clan (US Department of State, 2013). In the 1980s, Somalis in 
less favored clans began to chafe under the government’s rule. Barre’s ruthlessness could not 
suppress the opposition, which in 1990 began to unify against him (BBC News, 2005). After 
joining forces, the combined group of rebels overthrew Barre from Mogadishu in January 
1991. No central government re-emerged to take the place of the overthrown government, 
and the US closed its embassy that same year, although the two countries never broke off 
diplomatic relations (US Department of State, 2013). The country descended into chaos, and 
a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions began to unfold. Drysdale (1994) noted that 
“when, President Siad Barre fled the country in late Jan 1991, his departure left Somalia in 
the hands of a number of clan-based guerrilla groups, none of which trusted the other 
(Drysdale, 1994:38).  Power struggles between clan warlords - Mohamed Farah Aideed, and 
Ali Mahdi Mohamed killed and wounded thousands of civilians (Drysdale, 1994, p. 
38).Throughout south-central Somali, Hirsh and Oakley (1995) indicated that looting and 
criminality by armed gangs and militia led to massive displacement, eventually resulting in a 
catastrophic famine that claimed an estimated 250,000 lives (Hirsh and Oakley, 1995: 5). 
Eventually, the destructive battle divided Mogadishu into two parts, and a "Green Line"" was 
drawn between the two warring sub-clan factions (Clerk, 1993: 211). While the armed militia 
of Ali Mahdii controlled the north of the capital, that of General Aideed controlled the areas 
in the south, such as the airport and seaport. The split of the USC alliance resulted in the 
emergence of the Somali National Alliance (SNA). This new alliance was formed by General 
Aideed to counter Ali Mahdi and his forces. As a result, the two Mogadishu-controlled 
militias resumed fierce clashes with each other, causing further destruction and more social 
havoc, particularly in the southern part of the country (Africa Watch, 1992:7). During the last 
months of 1991, neutral traditional elders made repeated attempts to mediate a cease-fire, and 
reconcile the warring militias, but they also failed. Consequently, as the conflict in the south 
remained unabated, northern Somalia seceded. The leadership of the SNM in the north of the 
country declared the political independence of the region from the rest of the country. 
Northern Somalia then became the Republic of Somaliland. In fact, the SNM unilateral 
declaration of political independence for northern Somalia also contributed further to the 
disintegration of the state.   Lyons and Ahmed Samatar (1995:23) noted that "the SNM's 
actions contributed to the dissolution of Somalia as a nation-state, the destruction of pan-
Somalism, and the acceleration of the balkanisation of northeast Africa". The power struggle 




4.3 Brief Background of Dominant Somali Warring Faction 
The ICU– The phenomenon of the Islamic courts in Somalia first appeared in the North of 
Mogadishu in August 1994. Islamic clerics from the locally powerful Abgal sub-clan of the 
Hawiye (Somalia largest and currently most powerful clan) founded the first fully functioning 
sharia court. The enforcement of the court judgements depended on militias recruited from 
the local clan. The Islamic courts were part of a clan power in Mogadishu. They served the 
Hawiye clans and earned the support of the Hawiye business clans of Mogadishu with the 
aim to provide security (Marchal, 2004:114--145) Right from the beginning, political 
infighting, rivalry and disunity characterised groups in Somalia. The Islamic courts were a 
huge success in dealing with criminality in north Mogadishu. However, when it became clear 
that Shiekh Ali Dheere was becoming a rival source of authority to the Abgal Warlord – 
entrepreneur Ali Mahdi, the latter demoted him and dismantled the courts (Hassan and 
Barnes, 2007: 6-8). The court was later established in the south of Mogadishu in May 1998 
by the Saleban sub-clan of the Haber Gedir. After some time, other clans began to establish 
their own Islamic courts. Thought still motivated in local clan power, the Islamic courts in the 
south was far more advanced than the former court in the North. In 2000, the various 
independent Islamic courts of south Mogadishu formed a joint Islamic court council with 
Sheik Hassan Mohamed Addeh and the chairman of the Ifka Halene court as its head.  They 
combined their respective court militias to create an Hawiye military force. The Joint Islamic 
court extended their presence beyond Mogadishu. Ethiopia saw the rise and growing 
influence of the court as a threat to their security, invaded Mogadishu and defeated the ICU 
insurgency (Hassan and Barnes, 2007: 7). This brief history of the ICU is a clear indication 
that if Somalis are united for one cause, it can be accomplished. It also shows that in an effort 
to transform conflict in a divided society, all relevant groups should be involved, with 
concrete efforts to transform relationships amongst groups, and a suitable federal system in 
place to win the hearts and minds of the people with to ensure lasting peace. 
Al-Shabaab – Historically, Al-Shabaab is a fundamentalist faction within the ICU – a youth 
group, formed in the early 1990s as a militant remnant of a previous Somali Islamist 
Organization – AIAI (Wise, 2011:3). Al-Shabaab is one of the most feared and powerful 
militant jihadist outfits in Africa, and the only military force visible to fight the invasion of 
Ethiopia in 2006, following the collapse of the ICU. Al-Shabaab was formed as a Sharia 
court militia in Mogadishu in the 1990s, and then served as the militant wing of the ICU - a 
powerful force in southern Somalia that controlled most part of Somalia prior to the invasion 
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of Ethiopian forces in December 2006. Al-Shabaab leaders included committed jihadists, 
some of whom had served with the Afghan mujahideen. Until the Ethiopian occupation, the 
group answered to Hassan Dahir Aweys, a major figure in the ICU (Menkhaus and Boueck, 
2010:1-3). While the Ethiopian intervention was designed to fight against the Somali Islamist 
threat, and support the TFG formed in 2004, Al-Shabaab was able to successfully conflate its 
radical Islamism with Somali nationalism. By 2008, Al-Shabaab regained control of much of 
southern Somalia—and inflicted heavy casualties on the TFG (Menkhaus, 2009:5). 
According to Wise (2011) he noted that 
‘’Even though the group was founded several years earlier, the period between the 
Ethiopian invasion of December 24 2006 and early 2008 marked the true emergence 
of Al-Shabaab. Prior to the invasion, Al-Shabaab had been little more than a bit player 
within the larger ICU, largely serving the courts. Many militant Wahhabi leaders such 
as Aden Hashi Ayro decided to stay and fight as part of Al-Shabaab’’ (Wise, 2011:4)  
While the TFG was being formed in Kenya in 2004, heavy fighting characterised Mogadishu 
due to competition amongst warlords. As a result, robbery, rape, murder, destruction of 
infrastructure and ethnic cleansing became the order of the day (Human Rights Watch, 
2008:4). From the analysis above, it is important to note however that violent conflict in 
Somalia between 2004-2006 was not solely motivated against the TFG, but was also 
motivated by greed, dominance and control amongst warlords because unity was completely 
absent. In summary, the target and motives of Al-Shabaab became unclear, as they kept 
changing their focus. Menkhaus and Boueck noted that: 
“But when Ethiopia withdrew in January 2009 after the two-year insurgency, Al-
Shabaab lost the two things that it defined itself as being against—the Ethiopian 
occupation and leader of the Transitional Federal Government, Abdullahi Yusuf 
Ahmed, who was pressured to resign. Still, the new coalition in the transitional 
government was unable to take advantage and Al-Shabaab successfully recast itself as 
a resistance to the African Union peacekeeping force. The terrorist group painted the 
peacekeepers as armed infidels occupying Somalia and portrayed the transitional 
government as apostates and puppets of the West’’ (Menkhaus and Boueck, 2010:1).    




4.4 The Formation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government 
After the death of Mohamed Farah Aideed, tensions began to rise when the Puntland region 
of Somalia declared autonomy in 1998. In line with the establishment of Puntland in 1998, 
regional dynamics began to play out when Ethiopia and the West shifted their policies in 
Somalia to a building block approach which aimed to revive the state of Somalia through a 
federation of regional governments (Interpeace, 2008: 15).  Though this was a promising 
approach, Interpeace (2008) noted that,  
“Ethiopia developed alliances with Somali factions for its own security, and to deny 
openings for Eritrea.  The result of Ethiopia’s regional interest almost threatened 
Somali security when in 1999 the RRA, backed by Ethiopia, took control of the 
southern regions of Bay and Bakool, and established a regional administration with 
aspirations to extend its interests into Gedo and Lower Shabelle” (Interpeace, 
2008:15).  
This likely contributed to further resentments, but “an all-Hawiye peace conference in Belet 
Wein also raised hopes of reconciliation within the Hawiye clan-family at the time” 
(Interpeace, 2008: 15). According to Interpeace (2008), “these developments coincided with a 
period of economic growth and reconstruction in many areas in Somalia, as well as economic 
integration between the Somali regions” (Interpeace, 2008). According to Interpeace (2008),  
“This period also saw the growing influence of Islamic courts, which provided much 
desired security and law in southern Somalia; Islamic charities, particularly in 
Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle; and an emergent civil society” (Interpeace, 2008:15).  
Whilst some Somalis saw this building block approach from Ethiopia as harmful, it marked 
the beginning for a change in regional and international intervention.  In August 2000, a 
parliament convened in Arta, Djibouti and elected Somalia's first transitional government that 
experienced national and international support (Doornbos, 2001: 192-198). Since the 
understanding of the applicability of conflict transformation was low, other armed groups 
who felt dissatisfied with the first attempt at reconciling Somalia went out of control. 
According to the (BBC 2001), remnant armed groups from various clans and pro-government 
allies built up resentment against each other, and efforts by the Somali authorities to unite 
these groups failed. Thus, in April 2001, Somali warlords, backed by Ethiopia, declined to 
support the transitional administration. Severe fighting and drought broke out in 2001 
resulting to the UN appealing for food aid to half a million people (Zaphod, 2001). After the 
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governments first year in office, it still controlled only 10% of the country. In August 2003, 
its mandate expired. New talks by the Somali Parliament to establish a TFG began in October 
2003 which resulted in the inauguration of “a 275 member transitional parliament for a five 
year term in August 2004” (Dagne, 2011:1). The establishment of the transitional mechanism 
which prepared the country for a stable and democratic future was absolutely essential. 
During this transition, emphasis was placed on the transformation  
“of essential services, complete disarmament, restoration of peace and domestic 
tranquillity, and on the attainment of reconciliation of the Somali people. Emphasis 
was also placed on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure, and on 
the building of democratic institutions” (USIP, 1993: 3).  
According to USIP (1993), “this prepared the country to enter a constitutional phase in which 
the institutions of democratic governance, rule of law, decentralization of power, protection 
of human rights and individual liberties, and the safeguarding of the integrity of the Somali 
Republic are all in place” (USIP, 1993:3). The new TFG, “however, spent its first year 
operating from Kenya as Somalia remained too violent and unstable to enter, but it eventually 
settled in the provincial town of Baidoa” (AMISOM, 2014). This was because the security 
situation within Somalia was unstable. In the meantime, the establishment of a TFG saw the 
return of Somali government officials from exile – a promising attempt for further 
reconciliation. The establishment of the TFG constitutes the first attempt in the restoration of 
national institutions to Somalia. For instance, for the first time in February 2006, the 
Transitional Parliament met in the town of Baidoa since it was formed in 2004 (ICSMUN, 
2013) to discuss matters of state security.  The TFG was recognized internationally as well as 
locally, but made a mistake by failing “to follow through on the reconciliation efforts that 
began in Arta for a government of national unity” (ICSMUN, 2013). The TFG began to face 
difficulties when ICU began to wage a serious violent campaign throughout Somalia, until 
the US and Ethiopian military intervention in 2006 which helped drive out the rival ICU in 
Mogadishu, and strengthen the TFG’s rule. After this defeat, the ICU split into several 
different factions. Some of the more radical elements, including Al-Shabaab, regrouped to 
continue their insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military’s presence in Somalia 
(AMISOM, 2014). The other groups were mostly unaccounted for, leaving room for more 
resentment and violent reprisal against the TFG.  According to Infoplease (2005),  
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“In May 2006, the country's worst outbreak of violence in 10 years began, with 
Islamist militias, called the SICC, engaged in a fierce battle against rival warlords. 
The Somali Islamic Courts Council (SICC) seized control of the capital Mogadishu, 
and established control in much of the south on 6
th
 June 2006” (Infoplease, 2005).  
The TFG, led by President Abdullahi Yusuf, “spent months engaging in unsuccessful peace 
negotiations with the SICC” (Infoplease, 2005). In the meantime, neighbouring Ethiopia, 
considered SICC a threat to regional security, and began to launch air strikes against the 
Islamists.  Ethiopia later “announced that its troops would remain in the country until stability 
was assured and a functional central government was established.  Somalia's 15 years of 
anarchy experienced a little bit of calm at that time” (Infoplease, 2005).  
4.5 AU Intervention in Somalia: From IGASOM to AMISOM 
As a body responsible for international peace and security, the UN decided to assist Somalia 
through regional arrangements in mitigating conflicts in Africa. On December 6, 2006, the 
United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1725,  
“reiterating its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation 
in Somalia through the Transitional Federal Charter, and stressing the importance of 
broad-based and representative institutions and of an inclusive political process, as 
envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter” (UN Security Council Resolution 
1725: 1)’’.  
The Resolution 1725 further called for all member states, in particular those in the region, to 
refrain from any action in contravention of the arms embargo and related measures, and 
should take all actions necessary to prevent such contravention. Moreover, the Resolution 
expresses its willingness to engage with all parties in Somalia who are committed to 
achieving a political settlement through peaceful and inclusive dialogue, including the ICU 
(UN Security Council Resolution 1725: 1).  Determining that the situation in Somalia 
continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, the Security 
Council, decided on plans for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission of IGAD in Somalia 
(IGASOM). Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN authorized IGAD and the 
AU to establish IGASOM - a protection and training mission with the mandate to monitor the 
progress of the TFG, ensure security and training of the Somali security apparatus on 6 




These mandates were drawn from the relevant elements of the mandate and concept of 
operations specified in the deployment plan for IGASOM (UN Security Council Resolution 
1725: 2). Despite the strong support IGASOM had from the AU, it could not establish a 
strong security hold for the TFG, because member states were not willing to support the 
mission openly. Also, most of the belligerents in Somalia were averse to peacekeeping 
operations as well (Mays, 2009:16). The challenges faced by IGASOM have a direct link to 
the role played by regional countries. Ethiopia’s interest at some point prevented Somalia to 
be free from certain warlords. Elmi (2010) noted that in 2006, the ICU emerged and defeated 
most of Somali warlords. The greater part of Somalia was pacified, for example, the Lower 
Shabella, Hiran and Middle Shabella region. These achievements gained by the ICU made 
them very famous in Somalia. Ethiopia on the other hand perceived the move by ICU a threat 
to national security, and sent thousands of Ethiopian troops to capture Mogadishu (Elmi, 
2010:95). Elmi also noted that Ethiopia had been actively involved militarily and politically 
in Somalia’s internal affairs since 1991, and should there be an interim government is formed 
in Somalia, Ethiopia would support warlords leading to destabilization during the transition 
(Elmi, 2010:96). To buttress this, Elmi and Barise stated:  
‘‘When Ali Mahdi was chosen to head an interim government in 1992, Ethiopia 
supported his main rival, General Aideed. When Aideed became stronger and created 
his own administration in 1994, Ethiopia supported Ali Mahdi and his groups. When 
all Somali groups signed the Cairo Accord, Ethiopia recruited Abdullahi Yusuf and 
Aden Abdullahi Nur. When Somalis formed the TNG, Ethiopia organized all the 
opposition, helped then create the SRRC (Somali Restoration and Reconciliation 
Committee) and provided military aid to subvert the TNG’’ (Elmi and Barise, 2006: 
42).      
Similarly, Kenya on the other hand sided with Ethiopia in 1964 and 1967 against Somalia 
over the Ogaden region. Kenya saw Somalia as an aggressor state when it’s signed a mutual 
defence pact with Ethiopia against Somalia in the 1960s (Elmi, 2010:97). Thus, issues of 
regional interest have always clouded a fair and sincere regional intervention to end the 
conflict in Somalia - except that of Djibouti which was relatively different (Internal Conflict 
and International Action, 1996: 603-628).  The focus on member states interest rather than on 
alleviating violent conflict in Somalia resulted in a number of civilian casualties.  Factional 
violence in Mogadishu between the UIC in 2006-2007, killed hundreds of civilians and 
displaced many more people. The surge in violence was due to conflict between militia loyal 
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to the ICU, and a self-proclaimed anti-terrorism coalition backed by powerful local warlords 
(Dagne, 2007: 8). The inability of the TFG to establish effective control allowed warlords and 
clan factions to dominate many parts of Somalia until January 2007, when according to 
Goodspeed (2006), “the US launched airstrikes on the retreating Islamists, who they believed 
included three members of al-Qaeda suspected of being involved in the 1998 bombings of the 
American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam” (Goodspeed, 2006: 6). According to 
Elmi (2010), the fighting created a humanitarian crisis, with thousands of Somalis fleeing the 
fighting in Mogadishu in just two months (Elmi, 2010:85). Interpeace (2008) highlighted that  
“efforts by the TFG and Ethiopia to impose their authority through force, provoked violent 
resistance from a mixture of Mogadishu-based clan militia, and the remnants of the militant 
wing of the ICU – Al Shabaab al Mujahidiin (the Mujahideen Youth Movement) (Interpeace, 
2008: 17). Interpeace (2008) indicated that,  
“during 2007 alone, fighting between the TFG and the insurgency caused the deaths 
of several thousand civilians, the displacement of up to 700,000 people from 
Mogadishu, and widespread destruction of the city” (Interpeace, 2008: 17).  
 
In February 2007, the UN Security Council Resolution 8960 authorized the AU to deploy a 
peacekeeping mission in support of Somalia’s TFIs. Few months later, AMISOM was 
deployed in Mogadishu.  
 
AMISOM is an active peacekeeping mission operated by the AU with the approval of the 
UN. It was created by the AU’s PSC on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. 
AMISOM is mandated to conduct PSOs in Somalia, and to stabilize the situation in the 
country in order to create conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities, and an 
immediate take over by the UN. The mission was expected to support dialogue and 
reconciliation by working with all relevant stakeholders, and protect key infrastructure and 
TFIs. The mission was also to assist Somalia in the implementation of its NSSP, provide 
security, and facilitate humanitarian assistance (Communiqué of the AU, 2007).   
At the time of the missions deployment, there were roughly 6,000 peacekeepers deployed 
under AMISOM out of a total authorized strength of 8,000 (UN Security Council, 2007).  As 
a result, Al-Shabaab gained military victories by taking control of key towns and ports in 
both central and southern Somalia throughout 2007 and 2008. At the end of 2008, the rebels 
had captured Baidoa, but not Mogadishu. AMISOM further noted that in January 2009; the 
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Ethiopian troops withdrew from the country, leaving behind AU peacekeeping force as the 
only protector for the TFG (AMISOM, 2005).  
4.6 Political Tension between 2007-2012 
The period 2007-2008 saw heightened political tension in Somalia as efforts to support 
dialogue and reconciliation gathered steam. Abdille and Botha, (2014) indicated that “Al-
Shabaab, the militant wing of SICC, began gaining strength as it allied itself with al-Qaeda 
and won the support of many local warlords, primarily in the south. The group has raised 
alarms in the US over concern that its brand of militant Islam would spread throughout 
eastern Africa and beyond (Abdille and Botha, 2014: 13). Al-Shabaab has transformed itself 
into an army, with the intelligence capability to carry out massive attacks. They force people 
to give out information through intimidation, bribery, and murder, “by banning many forms 
of technology, while continuing to wage war against the transitional government” (Abdille 
and Botha, 2014: 13). Al-Shabaab took advantage of the power vacuum and weak transitional 
government (AMISOM, 2008). They were able to control almost all of southern Somalia by 
February 2009 (AMISOM, 2008). The height of political tension was triggered when Al-
Shabaab perceived AMISOM as proxies of the US, and member states contributing troops to 
AMISOM were not willing to contribute troops in the fight against terror. Al-Shabaab began 
waging serious fight against AMISOM, without understanding that the primary purpose for 
which AMSIOM was deployed was to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation. Thus, in a state 
of doubt and fear, AMISOM found itself involved in serious combat operations within this 
period (Hayatou and Sturman, 2010: 71).   Political tension was also exacerbated by different 
interests within the TFG during the period of dialogue and reconciliation. For instance, under 
President Yusuf (2004-2008), Interpeace (2008) indicated that Prime Minister Ali 
Muhammed Ghedi resigned in October 2007 after a political disagreement. He was 
succeeded by Nur Hassan Hessein of the Abgaal sub-clan of the Hawiye from November 
2007. However, he was dismissed by President Yusuf in December 2008 because, according 
to Interpeace (2008),  
“he had failed to accomplish his duties. It was not clear, however, whether Yusuf had 
the authority to make such a constitutional change. The following day, Parliament 
passed a vote of no confidence in support of Hussein. Despite the vote, President 
Yusuf appointed Muhammad Mahmud Guled Gamadhere as Prime Minister. Guled 
later resigned, noting that he did not want to be seen as a stumbling block to the peace 
process which was going well at the time” (Interpeace, 2008:16).  
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As a result of the power struggle that emerged, President Yusuf also resigned. The inability 
by the TFG to manage the diverse interests of multiple groups and factions was very 
challenging. As a result, most of the peace processes undertaken left out certain groups.  
The Djibouti dialogue and reconciliation peace process unfolded four rounds of talks in 2008. 
It resulted in a series of agreements signed between the TFG and the ARS-Djibouti faction on 
9 June, 26 October, and 25 November, respectively. Ethiopia supported the talks politically, 
and placed heavy pressure on President Yusuf of the TFG to embrace the accord. President 
Yusuf rejected the accord and resigned, paving the way for the formation of a new 
government.  The peace accord called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and a cessation 
of hostilities came into effect on 26 October 2006.  The move by President Yusuf was 
detrimental to the peace process, and again the lack of representation of a larger number of 
Islamic opposition in the Djibouti peace process severely affected reconciliation in Somalia 
for quite a long period of time as Al-Shabaab and the ARS-Asmara faction – Eritrean based 
(led by the influential Hassan Dahir Aweys) condemned the agreement, and Al-Shabaab 
intensified its violent insurgency in Mogadishu (Kasaija, 2009:269-74). 
 
With Ethiopia pulling out, and the continuous threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the subsequent 
resignation of presidents of the TFG affected the transformation of conflict, and increased 
political insecurity.  Kingsley (2010) noted that “Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke, who has 
been criticized for failing to defeat Al – Shabaab, and who has been at odds with President 
Ahmed,  resigned in September 2010. He was succeeded by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed” 
(Kingsley, 2012: 35).  
Kingsley further provided a historical process of power change in Somalia. He noted that “In 
June 2011, Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed resigned. This allowed Abdiweli 
Mohamed Ali to become acting Prime Minister.This was approved by parliament and he was 
sworn in on June 28, 2011” (Kingsley, 2012: 35).  Dagne (2010) also explained that “after 
more than 19 years and 14 attempts at forming an internationally recognized central 
government, the Somali parliament held its inaugural session on August 2012, rife with 
disorganization, corruption, and concerns for the safety of the participants. The swearing in 
took place at the airport in Mogadishu, and was watched over by AU troops” (Dagne, 
2010:1). According to the Somali community,  
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“this landmark occasion was followed by the election of former labor Minister - 
Mohamed Osman Jawa as speaker. In September 2012, parliament elected Hassan 
Sheikh Mohamud, an advocate for civil rights, as president. President Hassan 
prevailed over incumbent Sharif Sheikh Ahmed in the second round of voting” 
(Somali Community, 1993). 
 According to the Somali Community, 
 “many observers expressed hope and optimism that Hassan, who is considered above 
corruption, would set the country on a path toward stability, unify the TFG, and 
promote conflict transformation” (Somali Community, 1993).  
Since disorganization and disunity within the TFG was not addressed before the inaugural 
session in August 2012, the impact of this disunity became visible in a short while. President 
– Hassan Mohamud survived an assassination attempt a few days later by a member of Al - 
Shabaab (Roggio, 2010:1).  The Somali government with the help of AMISOM and Kenyan 
forces decided to launch an attack against Al-Shabaab, and took over Somalia's port city of 
Kismayu (Roggio, 2010:1). The city was the last stronghold of Al-Shabaab - a very vital port 
used to finance their campaign.  This was a major victory for President Hassan Mohamud’s 
government under the TFG.  
4.7 The current (2013-2014) state of Security in Somalia: Political, Humanitarian and 
Security Dimensions  
“Somalia is currently emerging from over twenty years (1991-2012) of state collapse and 
underdevelopment. As a result, many Somalis are determined to rebuild the country and work 
towards sustainable peace’’ (AMISOM, 2014). However, Mohamud (2013) indicated that 
“there are persisting security challenges despite recent military gains against Al-Shabaab” 
(Mohamud, 2013:1).  With the election of Somalia’s new federal president on 16
 
September 
2012, Mohamud (2013) indicated that Mr. Hassan Sheik Mohamud outlined his vision for 
Somalia for the next four years. In his vision, he underscores that security was a priority area 
to address in a country that is suffering from environmental, economic, social, and political 
malaise” (Mohamud, 2013:1). Somalia is currently faced with a number of security threats 
that can be contextualized into social and cultural perspectives. One key security threat is the 
challenge posed by Al-Shabaab. President Hassan Sheik Mohamud focused on this aspect 
during his speech on 6 September 2012.  In this speech, the New York Times (2012) reported 
that the president offered Al-Shabaab an opportunity for “political dialogue while at the same 
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time made it clear that all options were on the table - including military action” (The New 
York Times, 2012). The president also highlighted the need for judicial and democratic 
reforms as a critical factor in an attempt to restore security in Somalia.  As a result, Somalia 
is currently going through basic institutional, economic, cultural and social reforms amidst 
the fight against Al-Shabaab.  
  
4.8 The Political State 
From February 2013, the political and security situation in Somalia seems to have improved. 
The FGS is working towards the efforts to implement its Six‐Pillar Plan adopted in October 
2012, (IOM, 2011).  The six pillar plan indicated key areas of focus. These include: “security 
and rule of law, economic recovery, dialogue and reconciliation, service delivery, building 
collaborative international relations, and regaining the unity and territorial integrity of 
Somalia” (IOM, 2011). During the opening of the second session of his parliament last year - 
2 March 2013, Abdi Farah Shirdon – the Somali Prime Minister presented on the 
government’s progress report. According to DIFID (2012), “the report highlighted that the 
security situation has improved, marked by the recovery of major towns from Al - Shabaab 
and the reduction of piracy off the coast of Somalia. It also outlined reforms in the judiciary, 
with the adoption, of a Justice Sector Action Plan for the period 2013 ‐ 2015” (DIFID, 2012). 
Furthermore, “the report covered steps taken to improve the provision of social services, 
notably a three‐year plan to enrol 1 million children in school, and the standardization of the 
education curriculum in Somalia” (DIFID, 2012). The report also highlighted that “the Prime 
Minister indicated that the FGS had presented a number of bills to Parliament, including draft 
laws on oil production, fishing, toxic waste, the protection of Somali waters, the media and 
civil aviation” (DIFID, 2012). The National Stabilization Plan (2013) adopted in February 
2013 is a key strategy put forward by the government to expend its administration. To 
implement this plan, the Prime Minister initiated a national listening tour in the country 
between February-March 2013. During this time, the African Union (2013) reported that “he 
visited major towns in Galgaduud, Puntland, Lower Juba, Gedo and Middle Shabelle 
regions”. This visit included “a roadmap on the establishment of local administrations across 
the country, particularly in those towns that have been recovered from Al - Shabaab by the 




In the Communiqué of the PSC at its 375
th
 meeting in May 2013, the Commission of the 
Chair Person on the situation of Somalia stated that  
‘‘the Prime Minister’s ‘listening tours’ have been largely successful, and tangible 
progress has been recorded, as shown by the issuance by the government, on 4 
February, of a decree regarding the formation of a new interim administration for the 
Bay region and the appointment, on 8 April 2013, of a new administration for Hiran 
region’’ (Addis Ababa. African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 2).  
 
Despite the success, the process of establishing a regional administration for Jubbaland faces 
serious challenges. These include disagreements over how federalism should be 
implemented, and who should drive the process (IRIN 2013). IGAD, (2013) reported that 
“this process began in Nairobi in June 2012, with a meeting that brought together participants 
from Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo regions, under the aegis of the Grand Stabilization 
Plan adopted by IGAD on 27 January 2012” (IGAD, 2013). The African Union Peace and 
Security Council (2013) noted that “following the election of President Hassan Sheikh 
Mohamud, the FGS declared that the processes to establish local administrations should be 
led from Mogadishu, and should be more inclusive” (African Union Peace and Security 
Council, 2013: 2). While this option tends to be favoured by many Somalis, care should also 
be taken when operationalising decentralization. Somalia under the TFG has a long history of 
disagreement by which relationships between groups can easily be affected negatively. This 
is because federalism may not be effective in responding to security threats, and sometimes 
can create a slow decision making process which may complicate relationships between 
individuals, and further promote division (Hague and Harrop 2013: 262). Menkahus (2007) 
noted that 
 “political decentralization has the potential to degenerate into armed conflict or even ethnic 
cleansing if not executed with considerable sensitivity to local realities” (Menkahus, 
2007:85).  
The FGS has and is trying to unify some self-governing parts of Somalia into its state 
administration. This was illustrated on 28 February 2013, when more than 500 delegates of 
the Jubbaland political clan “gathered in Kismayo, Lower Juba region, to discuss and plan the 
proposed formation of the Jubbaland state” (Nordlund and Skeppstrom, 2014). Nordlund & 
Skeppstrom (2014) further noted that “the Somali prime minister then travelled to Kismayo 
and informed the Jubbaland politicians, clans, and religious leaders that the Jubbaland state 
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conference was unconstitutional” (Nordlund & Skeppstrom, 2014:5-20). The Prime Minister 
then proposed to the political leaders that 
 “the Kismayo air and sea ports must be handed over to the FGS, and all militias be 
integrated into the SNSF. Further, the FGS insisted that all areas still under Al-
Shabaab control in the region be recovered before the state can be formed, on the 
understanding that it will thereafter appoint regional governors for Middle and Lower 
Juba, and Gedo” (Nordlund and Skeppstrom, 2014: 18).  
Though the offer was contested, the IGAD Heads of State and Governments reiterated  
“the need for all ongoing processes to establish regional administrations to be 
anchored on a set of principles, namely: leadership by the FGS; respect for the 
provisional Constitution of Somalia; inclusive consultative process; and fight against 
Al‐Shabaab as the primary focus of the FGS, AMISOM, and regional and 
international partners” (Nordlund and Skeppstrom, 2014: 18).  
 
The contested stance pulled off by clan politicians formally led to the establishment of the 
Jubbaland state on 15 May 2013. According to the African Union Peace and Security Council 
(2013),  
“Raas Kamboni was selected as militia leader, while Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam 
aka Madobe, as its president. Shortly thereafter, former Minister of Defense - Colonel 
Barre Adam Shire Hirrale, declared himself president of Jubbaland. This development 
raised concerns that fighting could erupt between supporters of the rival presidents if 
an agreement was not swiftly reached to resolve this standoff. In an effort to defuse 
tension, and following the decision by the 21st extraordinary summit of the IGAD 
Heads of State and Government, a high‐level fact‐finding and confidence building 
mission travelled to Mogadishu and Kismayo from 16 to 19 May 2013” (African 
Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 3).  
According to IGAD (2013), the IGAD Heads of State and Government acknowledged the 
report of the fact‐finding mission, and were satisfied with the agreement by stakeholders to 
respect the Somali provisional constitution, to accept the government’s leadership, and to 
conduct the process in an all‐inclusive manner, and in a way that helped in the fight against 
Al‐Shabaab (IGAD, 2013: 3). Further, the FGS deemed it necessary to embark on conflict 
transformation processes with a focus on reconciliation and integration of different militias 
into a unified national command of the SNA.  The African Union (2013) reported that the 
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reconciliation effort was successful, as members of parliament abandoned the vote of 
confidence against the Prime Minister, but at the same time stressed the importance to 
improve governance in the country (African Union, 2013). According to the African Union 
(2013), “the FGS has taken steps to enhance financial transparency and accountability, 
especially through the establishment of a special finance facility with the assistance of 
Norway” (African Union, 2013). Also, the African Union noted that “International 
institutions like the IMF have renewed their relations with Somalia. The FGS is also 
engaging other partners in order to mobilise more development assistance” (African Union 
Peace and Security Council, 2013: 3). Since the country has made significant progress, the 
need for sustained commitment by international partners to support conflict transformation 
efforts is paramount. 
  
4.8.1 Security Situation: The Threat Posed by AL-Shabaab  
The security situation in Somalia is still very fragile, but continues to improve. AMISOM 
(2014b) reported that “In March 2013, AMISOM forces and the SNSF recovered the last 
stretch of the 240 km Mogadishu‐Baidoa road from Al-Shabaab. Since then, efforts have 
focused on consolidating control over the recovered towns” (AMISOM, 2014 b and c). 
However, the FGS is faced with both operational and resource limitations, to the extent that it 
is difficult to further recover more territory from Al-Shabaab. An example of this challenge is 
demonstrated “when the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), in anticipation of 
AMISOM deployment in Sector 3 as stipulated in the mission’s operational benchmarks, 
withdrew from Huduur in Bakool region on 17 March 2013” (African Union Peace and 
Security Council, 2013:5). However, because of a lack of enablers (helicopters), AMISOM 
and the FGS were unable to deploy its forces to fill the gap (African Union Peace and 
Security Council, 2013: 5).  The African Union Peace and Security Council (2013) noted that 
“Al-Shabaab insurgents then seized the opportunity and retook the town” (African Union 
Peace and Security Council, 2013:6). According to the AU Commission (2013), the 
following key towns remain under the control of Al - Shabaab: “the port city of Barawe, in 
Sector 1; Jamaame, Jilib and Buale, in Sector 2; Baardheere and Dinsoor, in Sector 3; and 
Bulo Burto, in Sector 4” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 5).  The 
withdrawal of ENDF often resulted in tension in the region, as civilian population always flee 
the area, fearing a rise of Al-Shabaab activities (African Union Peace and Security Council, 
2013: 5). Despite this, the security situation has seemed to stabilized in recent times. 
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According to the Chair Person on the situation of Somalia, “the threat posed by Al-Shabaab 
has decreased, because of power struggles within the hierarchy of the group, and the 
successive defeats it has suffered, as a result of the military operations by the SNSF, 
AMISOM, and the ENDF” (United Nations, 2013:3). Despite this progress, a lot still needs to 
be done to defeat Al-Shabaab.  The United Nations, (2013) reported that “Al-Shabaab has 
launched a number of probing and asymmetrical attacks against AMISOM, Somalia National 
Security Forces (SNSF) and ENDF positions” (United Nations, 2013:3). These operations 
have currently increased, as Al-Shabaab supporters are using subtle means in the 
communities to ferment clan rivalry, political disagreement, and an absence of local 
administration (Addis Ababa. African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 5). On the 
other hand, AMISOM (2014) noted that “Al-Shabaab continues to enjoy the freedom to 
organize, train and access logistics, including weapons and munitions in areas under their 
control” (AMISOM, 2014). Al-Shabaab is not the only threat to security. The relationship 
between the FGS and its regional administrators represents a danger from both a political and 
a security perspective. There have been clashes between different militias related with the 
government and the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA), respectively over control of 
Kismayo, because Kismayo is a major source of revenue for everyone (Nordlund and 
Skeppstrom, 2014:21). 
 
4.8.2 The Humanitarian Situation 
According to the UN (OCHA, 2014), “Somalia’s humanitarian crisis remains among the 
largest and most complex in the world. Despite recent modest improvements in food security, 
an estimated 2.9 million people will need immediate life-saving and livelihood support in the 
next six months compared to 3.2 million people in late 2013” (OCHA, 2014). OCHA, (2014) 
reported that “decades of internal conflict have also led to more than 1 million people living 
as displaced persons across the country, the majority in southern and central areas within 
Somalia” (OCHA, 2014). The United Nations Radio reported that “poor and inadequate basic 
social services like education and health also continue to undermine the resilience of the 
people. Sobering statistics show that Somalia is among the top five countries in the world 
when it comes to the prevalence of child malnutrition and under-five mortality. One in seven 
children under the age of five is estimated to be acutely malnourished” (United Nations 
Radio, 2013:11).  OCHA noted that “more than 50,000 of these children are severely 
malnourished and stand the risk of dying without sustained assistance” (OCHA, 2013). 
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According to OCHA, “this number could double in subsequent years” (OCHA, 2013).  In 
2014, OCHA reported that 
 “one in every 10 Somali children die before their first birthday and one of every 12 
women die due to pregnancy related causes. Millions of Somalis remain vulnerable to 
disease outbreaks due to the absence of or weak state of health, water supply, 
sanitation and hygiene services. Also, only 30 per cent have safe access to water” 
(OCHA, 2014).  
OCHA (2014) also reported that “there is no protective environment for vulnerable people 
particularly women, girls and children. As a result, gender-based violence and violations 
against children are common and the level of response provided to survivors is low” (OCHA, 
2014). The United Nations (2013) indicated that “despite the efforts of humanitarian agencies 
and other actors, the current humanitarian response remains inadequate, partly because of 
access restrictions and funding gaps from the UN agencies” (United Nations, 2013:12). In the 
African Peace and Security Council Report (2013), is was stated that “although the security 
situation is improving, there are a number of security incidents which continue to restrict 
access, and thus, affect the delivery of assistance to the needy population” (African Union 
Peace and Security Council, 2013: 7). As of February 2014, the UN noted that the 
humanitarian situation in Somalia is still posing a challenge, as people continue to be 
displaced because of heavy rainfall. However, the mission provided relief supplies to affected 
population (United Nations, 2014:6) 
 
4.8.3 The Deployment of Forces 
AMISOM is currently engaging in efforts to develop and implements its protection of 
civilian’s strategy into the operations of the mission.  The Mission has drafted a “Mission‐
wide Protection of Civilians Strategy which was approved in May 2013” (AU PoC Draft 
Guidelines, 2010). The strategy “provides a comprehensive mission‐wide approach towards 
mainstreaming protection considerations into all aspects of AMISOM operations” (AU PoC 
Draft Guidelines, 2010). As a part of the missions’ efforts to strengthen the protection of 
civilians in its areas of operations, AMISOM has establishment a “Civilian Casualty 
Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC), as outlined in UN Security Council 
resolutions 2036(2012) and 2093(2013)” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2013: 
13). The main goal for the establishment of CCTARC is to save children’s lives and ensure 
civilians affected by conflict are recognized and helped, thereby contributing to the wellbeing 
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of the Somali population, and the success of the mission. CCTARC will provide AMISOM 
with the capacity to track and record incidents of allegations of civilian harm, providing 
accurate trends and data on civilian casualties; respond to individual incidents, ensuring that 
civilians receive recognition and amends losses while dispelling allegations and analysing 
information gathered to support the mission (Centre for Civilians in Conflict, 2011: 1). In the 
wake of the mission’s increase of troop and police personnel, the conduct of combat 
operations will be carefully monitored to protect civilians, and avoid any complication 
towards conflict transformation. The mission has also increased its uniform strength to 
further strengthen security stabilization for conflict transformation to be effective.  
According to the UN (2014),  
“the force strength of AMISOM military component deployed across the four sectors 
stands at 22,056, out of the authorized 22,126, due to rotations. The troop in theatre 
are composed as follows: 6,220 Ugandan soldiers; 5,338 Burundian soldiers; 3,664 
Kenyan soldiers; 1,000 Djiboutian soldiers; 850 Sierra Leoneans; 75 Force 
Headquarters Staff Officers, and 4,395 Ethiopian troops, who integrated AMISOM 
command and control on 1 January 2014” (United Nations, 2014:6).  
 
The strength of the police component stands at 514 consisting of 230 Individual Police 
Officers, “279 elements in the FPUs from Nigeria and Uganda, as well as 5 officers that make 
up the Police Senior Leadership Team” (United Nations, 2014:6). A police detachment of 12 
IPOs each has been deployed in Baidoa and Baletwyne, while another detachment of 12 IPOs 
is on standby for deployment to Kismayo. The civilian personnel strength includes 52 local 
and international staff, as well as 45 Somali Language Assistants supporting the Mission. 
(United Nations, 2014: 6). The coordination mechanisms outlined in the strategic concept of 
operation for AMISOM, namely “the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM), and the Military 
Operations Coordination Committee (MOCC), will continue to provide the platform for 
guidance and coordination for the mission at the strategic level” (United Nations, 2014:6). In 
conclusion, Somalia continues to face a number of security threats. Whiles the political 
situation seems stable, the prevalent of security threats makes the country still volatile.  
 
4.9 A Chronology of Somalia’s Conflict Transformation Processes 
The 1991 Political Reconciliation 
The first attempt to settle the violent conflict that broke out in Somalia in 1991 did not focus 
on transforming the relationship between the warring parties. It follows a win-lose solution 
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that was not ideal for the pattern of conflict at that time. Wheeler and Roberts, (2002) noted 
that “following the removal of Siad Barre in 1991, the first two international reconciliation 
meetings that took place in Djibouti in June and July 1991, was aimed at re-establishing a 
Somali government” (Wheeler & Roberts, 2002: 8). On July 15, 1991, six Somali factions 
agreed to a two-year interim government under the provisions of the old 1961 constitution, 
with Ali Mahdi Muhammad of the Hawiye clan as President, and Umar Arteh Ghalib of the 
Isaaq clan as Prime Minister. The new government had to be reorganized because the country 
had slid into anarchy (Wheeler & Roberts, 2002: 8). There was also no formal infrastructure 
left, and the Somali armed forces had been disbanded. Since relationships were not 
transformed among parties, factional fighting between clans prevented the new government 
from establishing control. There was no provision made for the other party, neither was there 
a provision for addressing relationships. Thus, the new government was immediately rejected 
by General Muhammad Farah Aideed, which resulted in a bloody civil war in Mogadishu and 
the south. One reason for the failure of this reconciliation attempt was that, General 
Mohammad Farah Aideed opposed the presidency of Ali Mahdi Muhammad and eventually 
organized an armed faction of the United Somali Congress (USC). Compounding that 
challenge was “the opposition of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and Somali 
Patriotic Movement (SPM)” (Wheeler & Roberts, 2002) who, believing they were 
disenfranchised by the provisional government, aligned themselves against the USC resulting 
in fighting between the various factions and clans, and control of Kismayo and Baidoa 
became an objective. The populations of both urban areas suffered greatly from the fighting 
and the deprivation they endured as a result of the interdiction of their markets and 
distribution system (Wheeler & Roberts, 2002: 8). Also, major international partners like 
AMISOM were not in Somalia at the time to facilitate dialogue between important players, 
therefore, there was no strong partner to influence what was put into writing to reflect the 
benefit of all. 
 
Conference on National Reconciliation 1993 
The United Nations (1996) noted that “on 27 March 1993, fifteen parties in the Somali civil 
war signed two agreements for national reconciliation and disarmament - an agreement to 
hold an informal preparatory meeting on national reconciliation, followed by the 1993 Addis 
Ababa Agreement made at the Conference on National Reconciliation” (United Nations, 
1996: 264-266). The National Reconciliation Conference agreed on the appointment, by the 
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Transitional National Council (TNC), “a Transitional Charter Drafting Committee to support 
the conference” (United Nations, 1996: 264-266). The Committee was guided by 
 “the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and by Somali 
traditional ethics. The conference agreed that the TNC would appoint a peace 
delegation composed of political movements and other social elements to travel to all 
parts of the country for the purpose of advancing the peace and reconciliation 
process” United Nations, 1996: 264-266.  
According to USIP (1996), the TNC  
“appointed a National Committee to bring about reconciliation, and seek solutions to 
outstanding political problems with the Somali National Movement (SNM), and also 
called upon the international community and in particular on neighboring states to 
facilitate the efforts at reconciliation by providing moral and material support” (USIP, 
1996:6).  
The principal problem with this reconciliation was that, “it left critical issues unresolved 
related to the transitional process. No real division of labor was established between the TNC, 
Regional Councils, and District Councils, which invited power tussles” (Interpeace, 2009:33). 
There was also a major lack of representation of the transitional governing bodies. Interpeace 
(2009) indicated that  
“the agreement presumes, for instance, the inclusion of the five regions of Somaliland 
in the Transitional National Charter, ignoring the fact that Somaliland had announced 
a unilateral secession in May 1991, and was not a party to the national reconciliation 
talks. Later, fighting broke out in Kismayo which resulted in the failure of the 
agreement” (Interpeace, 2009: 33). 
National Salvation Council 1997 
In an attempt to navigate AMISOMs contributions in Somali reconciliation, AMISOM (2015) 
indicated that “from November 1996 to January 1997, a conference on national reconciliation 
was held in Sodere, Ethiopia. It created a 41-member National Salvation Council (NSC) 
charged with the responsibility of organizing a transitional government. The conference was, 
however, boycotted by Hussein Farrah Aideed - a leader of his father’s faction following 
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Gen. Aideed’s death” (AMISOM, 2015). AMISOM noted that “a similar conference in 
Sana’a, Yemen, did not include all the parties of the conflict, and was rejected by those not 
attending” (AMISOM, 2015). These scenarios specifically showcased the relevance of 
conflict transformation which focused on transforming complex relationships between parties 
in a conflict environment.  
Cairo Peace Conference / Cairo Declaration 1997 
Conciliation Resources (2010) also reported that  
“a fourth reconciliation meeting in Cairo, Egypt, in December 1997 saw 28 
signatories to the ensuing agreement, including both Ali Mahdi and Hussein Farrah 
Aideed. The Cairo Declaration provided for a 13-person Council of presidents, a 
prime minister, and a national assembly, but left the country without a national 
leader” (Conciliation Resources, 2010:12). 
 These reconciliation efforts in Somalia were hindered by competition between these parties 
(Conciliation Resources, 2010:12). 
Somalia National Peace Conference 2000 
The conference was attended by “810 delegates representing each of the Somali clans from 
inside Somalia, and the diaspora. It was opened on 15 June 2000 by Djibouti President 
Guelleh. The aim of this conference was to draft an interim charter as the basis for 
governance in post-conflict Somalia” (Porto and Engel, 2014:224). This peace conference 
“was a series of meetings held in Arta, Djibouti, from 20 April – 5 May 2000. In contrast to 
previous reconciliation meetings, the Arta conference included extensive participation by 
unarmed civic leaders – intellectuals, clans, religious leaders and members of the business 
community” (Interpeace, 2009:34).  Porto and Engel (2014) indicated that “It culminated 
with the Arta Declaration and the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) 
- the first Somali government since 1991 to secure a measure of international recognition, and 
enabled Somalia to reoccupy its seat at the UN and in regional bodies” (Porto and Engel, 
2014:224).  According to Porto and Engel (2014), “the TNG was opposed by a rival pan-
Somali governmental movement, known as the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration 
Council (SRRC), which is made up of warlords from different regions of the country” (Porto 
and Engel, 2014:224). This attempt at reconciling Somalia was again limited by the lack of 




“While the Arta process provided space, for the first time, for civil society 
representatives, its most critical setback was the failure to engage key armed groups, 
who later became spoilers. Although the emerging Islamic courts, the business 
community, armed clans, and even some armed factions, such as the RRA, were 
among the major actors that participated in the process, the common factor shared by 
those participated in the Arta process was that the absence of many of the key armed 
faction leaders, and of regional and local administrative entities made the new 
government extremely vulnerable to spoilers. These groups prevented the TNG from 
establishing its authority in Mogadishu, let alone the rest of the country’’ (Interpeace, 
2009: 48). 
Somali Reconciliation Conference 2002 
In an effort to reconcile the TNG with its SRRC adversaries, IGAD launched a fresh national 
reconciliation process before the TNG mandate had ended. This process eventually developed 
into a sixth major Somali reconciliation meeting - the Somali National Reconciliation 
Conference, held in Eldoret, Kenya, in October 2002. It produced a ceasefire agreement 
signed by 24 faction leaders stipulating the need to create a federal structure, and reversing 
the unitary structure established at Arta (Porto and Engel, 2014:224). 
National Reconciliation Conference 2003 
AMISOM reported that “the 15th Somali National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) was 
held in Nairobi, Kenya, in September 2003. The Initiative to convene the conference was 
endorsed by the IGAD summit of 2003, and supported by the AU, the Arab League and the 
UN. At the conference, the TNG and the SRRC were reconciled, and a new united movement 
subsequently developed” (AMISOM, 2015). AMISOM (2015) further noted that “the 
Conference was successfully concluded with the formal adoption of a Federal Transitional 
Charter” (AMISOM, 2015). As noted by the UN in October 2003, by mid-September 2003, 
developments at the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference at Mbagathi, Kenya led to 
an impasse over the contested adoption of the Charter. Some of the leaders, including the 
president of the TNG, Abdiqassim, Colonel Barre Aden Shire (JVA), Mohamed Ibrahim 
Habsade of the (RRA), Osman Hassan Ali (“Atto”) and Musse Sudi (“Yalahow”) rejected the 
Charter, and returned to Somalia. On 30 September 2003, a group of them announced the 
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formation of the NSC consisting of “12 factions under the chairmanship of Musse Sudi) 
(United Nations, 2003:3). On 7 October 2003, the NSC signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the president of the Transitional National Government (TNG), in which it 
acknowledged the continuance in office of the TNG. The signatories also announced their 
intention to convene a new national reconciliation conference separate from the one at 
Mbagathi (United Nations, 2003:3).  
 
Nairobi Conference 2004 
The looming danger of a divisive outcome to the Mbagathi conference triggered concern 
from a number of quarters. International observers, including the European Union (EU) and 
the United States (US) lobbied the Kenyan government to restore inclusivity of the process – 
an epitome of conflict transformation. After nearly three weeks of arduous bargaining, the 
Safari Park Declaration was signed on “29 January 2004. The agreement called for the 
establishment of Transitional Federal Institutions as well as elections” (International Crisis 
Group, 2004:11). Confusion later occurred with this agreement where 17 leaders and four of 
the eight signatories of the agreement rejected the outcome. IGAD then stepped in to plan the 
final phase of the national reconciliation conference.  According to the International Crisis 
Group (2004), “this was followed by the inauguration of a Transitional Federal Parliament in 
August 2004, election of a president in 2004, and finally the granting of the vote of 
confidence to a prime minister and the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) in early 2005” (International Crisis Group, 2004:11). 
 
National Reconciliation Conference 2007 
In an attempt to address the ongoing factional conflict and establish peace and stability in the 
South Central region of Somalia, the TFG organized a national reconciliation conference. 
More than 1,300 people from Somalia’s regions and clans, including from the Somali 
diaspora were invited to participate. As a way of learning from the short falls of other 
reconciliation conferences, the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) made an effort to 
make the conference as inclusive as possible. For this reason, a significant amount of time 
was spent in different regions of Somalia to ensure the inclusion of all clans, sub-clans, 
minority groups, and dissidents. As a result of further division and diverse interest amongst 
groups,  XHCP (2007) noted that offshoots of the “Islamic Court Union (ICU) and opposition 
leaders held a separate meeting in Asmara, Eritrea, where they joined forces to fight the TFG 
under the banner of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)” (XHCP, 2007:2). 
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The Djibouti Peace Process 2008 
Dersso (2008) noted that,  
“he Djibouti peace process is a 2008 peace accord signed in neighboring Djibouti 
between the TFG and the ARS. It is meant to pave the way for the cessation of all 
armed conflict across the country” (Dersso, 2009: 7). The agreement attempted to 
transform the relationship between conflicting parties to the extent that all 11 
paragraphs contained in the agreement “expanded the parliament to include 
representatives of the opposition alliance and civil society” (Dersso, 2009: 7).  
Thus, Dersso (2009) noted that,  
“The element of the involvement of variety conflicting actors and an attempt to 
transform their relationship is a direct application of conflict transformation. Thus, the 
first phase of the Djibouti talks resulted in agreement on the formation of a new TFG 
in early 2009. This included the expansion of the Parliament from 275 to 550 
members, to bring in ARS parliamentarians, and an expanded cabinet. It also 
requested the UN to deploy an international stabilization force from countries that are 
friends of Somalia - excluding the neighboring countries, and the withdrawal of 
Ethiopian troops from Somalia” (Dersso, 2009: 7). 
According to AMISOM (2015), “the Djibouti process had the support of the international 
community, including the UN, the AU, the EU, and the US” (AMISOM, 2015). The AU – 
represented by AMISOM played a critical role in the facilitation of representatives from 
conflict parties and civil society organizations, thus contributing greatly to the Somalian 
conflict transformation processes. The Djibouti process which represented the first conflict 
transformation effort attempts to settle a protracted conflict seems a success to unify Somalia, 
when relationships were transformed and built. While there were other earlier attempts to 
unify Somalia, it also represents “the first universally known step in the broader process of 
political settlement and peacemaking in Somalia, as to builds upon the achievements of the 
earlier efforts” (Dersso, 2009: 7). One challenge this process encountered was to cement the 
gains that have been made, and to draw others into a constructive dialogue and out of a cycle 






By reviewing the background and nature of the conflict in Somalia, this chapter brings to 
light the importance of the unity of community structures to bring stability in the country. 
The people of Somalia have suffered immensely for decade, many lives have been lost, many 
children, and aged have been deprived of their right to survival and heritage. It is evident that 
a fundamental change in attitude and behaviour is needed to bring about lasting peace. 
Whilst building relationships between antagonist groups is one part of solving the problem 
according to the theory of conflict transformation, building state institutions through the 





























                     Findings of the Research 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present and interpret the research findings. The aim of this study was to 
examine AMISOM’s contribution to ending the conflict in Somalia, with reference to its role 
in addressing the root causes of the conflict directly or indirectly as it implements its 
mandate. 
 
This chapter analyses the research findings based on the key thematic areas the research 
questionnaire was centered on. These include: AMISOMs contributions to Conflict 
Transformation Efforts in Somalia; AMISOMs mandate that address the root causes of the 
Somali conflict; current focus of AMISOM in contributing to peace; the extent of AMISOMs 
contribution to conflict transformation in Somalia; main challenges to AMISOMs conflict 
transformation efforts in Somalia; relevance of conflict transformation in addressing the 
conflicts root causes; and progress in the implementation of AMISOMs mandate It then 
proceeded to assess the current progress made by AMISOM in contributing to conflict 
transformation in Somalia, by linking conflict transformation theory to the work AMISOM is 
currently doing  that is focused on conflict transformation.  
 
5.2 AMISOMs Contribution to Conflict Transformation Efforts in Somalia 
Improvement in Security  
It is very common to see the local population of Somalia now sipping coffee, eating at 
restaurants or strolling amongst stands selling sweets and ice cream late into the evening. 
About 90% of Somalia was under the control of Al-Shabaab. In most cases, there is relative 
stability in those areas. Today AMISOM forces controls 80% of the country, while 20% is 
under the control of Al-Shabaab. Respondent D provided a vivid example to this. She noted 
that:  
“in March 2014, Somali government forces supported by AMISOM troops began 
military operations in Baidoa, the capital city of Bay. AMISOM forces made 
significant gains against the extremist group by liberating the towns that they had 
once controlled. AMISOM and SNA  liberated 6 strategic towns: Hudur, 
Rabdhure,Ted, Weel dheyn and Burdhubow cities in Bakool and Gedo regions in 




Buule Burde, is a significant triumph for AMISOM as it was a strategic town for Al-Shaabab, 
as it served as their supply nerve centre and was home to hundreds of the Al-Shabaab 
fighters. The areas that are still under the control of Al-Shabaab are indicated in figure 6 
below.  
 
 Figure 6: Areas under Al-Shabaab’s control 
According to respondent A, ‘’security stabilization in Somalia is considered as the top 
priority approach in bringing stability to Somalia’’. Without stability in security, there will 
hardly be any attempt to address the root causes of the conflict. The research finds that 
AMISOM has brought some amount of stability to Mogadishu, where ordinary populations 
are conducting businesses on normal bases. 
 
5.3 Developing Local Capacity to Improve Security 
Respondent B highlighted that in 2013 alone,  
 
“AMISOM trained more than 1000 Somali Police Officers in Specialized Police Order 
Management Training as well as in other specialized areas on policing such as Basic Criminal 
Investigation’’. The respondent further noted that, AMISOM is consistently providing advice, 
mentoring and monitoring of the Somalia Police Force, to transform it to a credible 
organization. “AMISOM continues to advise, train, mentor and monitor the Somali Police 




 Respondent I gave a clear example of how AMISOM have built the capacity of the Somali 
National Army. Respondent I noted that “96 Army Officers graduated from a platoon 
Commander and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) training course. More than 4000, 
Somali troops have been trained so far on standard military training’’. According to 
respondent I, “the trainings have proved very effective in building local capacity of Somalis 
to be able to maintain law and order in the country. The Somali military are now well 
equipped to protect the geographical territory of Somalia, as well as to prevent human right 
violations’’. These have been the most successful effective initiatives the mission has 
undertaken since its inception. Respondent I further expound to say that, “today, Somalia’s 
security sector is full of well-trained police and military forces capable to own the peace 
process’’. It is therefore the opinion of this research that the approach by AMISOM to build 
the capacity of Somalia’s security forces directly addresses the issue of military repression 
which is amongst the major root causes of the Somali conflict. With these trainings, the 
Somali military and police component have been equipped with well know international 
standard of operations that is based on integrity and the necessity to safeguard the wellbeing 
of ordinary Somalis. The security sectors (police and military are likely grounded on how to 
conduct hostilities in line with international humanitarian law for example. This will enable 
them to protect the life of civilians during and after a conflict. The research finds that 
AMISOM has undertaken series of training and capacity building initiative to empower the 
Somali police and military personnel. 
 
5.4 Enhancing Good Governance in Somalia 
Respondent A noted that “in 2012, AMISOM supported the swearing in of President Hassan 
Sheikh Mohamud peacefully by providing essential security during the pre and post-election 
phases’’. Most importantly, Respondent C noted that “the AMISOM Political Affairs Unit 
advices the Somali government in dialogue and reconciliation efforts with other stakeholders 
in Somalia’’.  
 
According to respondents E and F and G, AMISOM has and continues to mobilise clan 
elders, religious and political leaders, including Members of Parliament, to resolve “political 
differences, improve security and support the FGS, particularly in Lower Shabelle, Middle 
Shabelle, Lower Jubba, Bay and Hiraan regions” (Interviews with respondents, July 2015).  
Respondent G noted that in the Hiraan region for example,  
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“AMISOM Political and Civil Affairs Officers worked closely with members of 
parliament in the formation of the Hiraan Council of Elders. Also, AMISOM 
facilitated a formal engagement between federal legislators from the Hiraan region, 
the local administration and population. AMISOM further engaged the youth 
population in the region, through the Hilaal Centre for Youth Development, to 
facilitate their participation in political and development issues in the region’’ 
(Interviews with respondent D, 2015).  
Respondents D also indicated that “AMISOM has continued to support dialogue amongst the 
various political actors in the country. Drawing lessons from the experiences of the 
transitional era, AMISOM Political Unit continues to engage with all political stakeholders in 
order to avoid a repeat of the continual problems that characterized the TFG” (Interview with 
respondent D, July 2015). Members of the TFG often fight against each other based on clan 
difference. Such political infighting often poses a challenge to regional or inter-clan dialogue.  
 
Respondent H further alluded that “AMISOM donated equipment to the Somalia government 
as part of their effort to help authorities re-establish functioning state institutions and deliver 
services to the Somali people’’.  However, this approach has only work effectively in certain 
regions in Mogadishu. The reason for this was expounded by Respondent H who noted that 
“the FGS state institutions need further support to be able to deliver essential health, 
education and infrastructural amenities to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. This is one key 
approach that has proved to bring stability in many of the areas under AMISOM control’’. 
The research finds that the approach of AMISOM support to the FGS to be able to provide 
basic social amenities to civilians under regions controlled by the government should 
continue, because without the contributions of AMISOM, the TFG will not exist. In 
examining the root causes of the Somali conflict, the research finds that AMISOM’s 
approach to building governance structures and reconciling political elites or entities within 
Somalia is an approach that directly addresses issues of clan differences. The dialogue and 
reconciliation initiatives foster social cohesion and inter-clan dialogue that has helped many 
regions within South and Central Somalia to unify. The research finds that AMISOM support 
to Somalia’s major governance transformation is an attempt to establish a functioning state in 
Somalia. The research also finds that AMISOM does not only support Somalia in the 
establishment of a strong government by providing security, it also provides support in terms 
of providing political guidance, monitoring, training, and advising the Somalia civil service 
sector. The research finds that this approach has so far enhanced inter-clan dialogue and 
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reconciliation in many of the areas recovered from Al-Shabaab.  Since conflict 
transformation suggests a pattern of satisfying the needs of all actors, the research finds that 
the mission has at the strategic political level worked towards this. AMISOM has and 
continues to support dialogue and reconciliation efforts at all levels in the country. These 
include “local and regional levels, as well as areas recovered from Al-Shabaab” (Interview 
with respondents H July 2015). According to the respondents, AMISOM has and continues to 
mobilize clan elders, religious and political leaders including parliamentarians to resolve their 
political differences, improve security and support the FGS. 
 
5.5 Strengthening Conditions and Structures Conducive to Sustainable Peace 
In strengthening conditions and structures conducive to sustainable peace, the research finds 
that AMISOM specifically established a Civil Affairs Unit within AMISOM in 2008 to 
support reconciliation efforts in Somalia, and extend the authority of the state. According to 
respondent I and K, noted that “AMISOM constructed primary schools to support school 
enrollment of youth and children in Wadajir District of Mogadishu’’, the respondent further 
noted that the AMISOM Civil Affairs Unit is working closely with the local authorities in the 
recovered areas. Examples are: Afgoye, Johwar and Marka. AMISOM is meeting elders and 
leaders in these areas to map out ways to enhance restoration of local administration. The 
research finds that such quick impact projects have been very successful in transforming 
regions from conflict to stability. This is because the people that live in the regions developed 
confidence in AMISOM and in the FGS because they provided essential facilities for their 
wellbeing. Based on the responses of the various respondents, example: “as part of the 
missions continued community engagement, AMISOM Civil Affairs donated non-food items 
to the population in Bula-Gaduug town in the lower Juba region. A total of 250 families 
benefitted from the donations as part of the quick impact project implemented by 
AMISOM’’, the research finds that support to the local population through quick impact 
project has been very beneficial to both AMISOM and the Somali people in terms of 
fostering conflict transformation. The research also finds that the absence of essential 
services within key regions in Somalia escalated conflict in many areas. Therefore, the 
approach of the mission to support the population through the provision of basic needs in the 
regions is addressing the root causes of the conflict and also serves as a deterrent to future 




State Formation and Federalism Process: Respondent D noted that “the Federal 
Government of Somalia has extended consultations with support from AMISOM on the draft 
Citizenship bill to the diaspora in London. Officials led by the Federal Minister of State, 
Interior and Federalism Mr. Abdirashid Xidig met with the Somali diaspora to collect their 
views on the proposed law’’. According to respondent D, a state formation process is 
underway in the central region, while initial discussions have been launched regarding the 
formation of the remaining federal state covering the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions. As 
these states are being established, demands for support in the form of capacity-building are 
increasing. Ensuring inclusivity in the political process remains critical. Respondent D noted 
that “Regional and local community reconciliation efforts will also need to be strengthened’’. 
The research finds that Progress has also been made in the state formation and federalism 
process. Two Interim Regional Administrations (IRAs) have been formed in Jubbaland and in 
South West according to respondent D.  It is of the opinion of this research that these 
approaches to conflict transformation undertaken by the mission can be employed or 
strengthens alongside AMSIOM’s PSOs to bring stability in Somalia. 
 
5.6 AMISOMs Mandate that Addresses the Root Causes of the Somali Conflict 
AMISOM, as a multidimensional Peace Support Operation, is mandated to: 
1. Take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somalia 
National Defence and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al- 
Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, 
2. Assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory, 
3. Assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across 
Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of security, including the 
protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and 
delivery of basic services, 
4. Provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the 
enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia State institutions, particularly the National 
Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions, 
5. Support the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for 




6. Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its 
capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of 
internally displaced persons and the return of refugees, 
7. Facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the 
stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, and 
8. Provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the 
right of self-defense. 
According to respondent H and K,   “paragraph three and four of AMISOMs mandate speaks 
towards assisting the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance 
across Somalia, through support as appropriate, in the areas of security, including the 
protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law, delivery of 
basic services, and providing, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other 
support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somali state institutions, particularly the 
National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions’’ (Interviews with 
respondents H and K, February 2015). The mission has undertaken a series of activities in 
implementing these specific mandates as highlighted under topic 5.1 - progress in the 
implementation of AMISOMs mandate. The research finds that paragraph six of AMISOMs 
mandate indicates that AMISOM should liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may 
be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the 
resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees.  
 
Based on the search findings from respondents A, and B, AMISOM seems to be doing a little 
bit less in this regard.  Respondent A and B noted that “AMISOMs focus on institutional 
building and the provision of security to UN and AU personnel does not create a major 
impact on the people of Somalia. The Somali institutions have been in place before the 
collapse of the state’’. Therefore, AMISOM should instill in the Somali people the values of 
the institutions rather than Institution building because people have lost confidence in the 
institutions – thus AMISOM should focus on building the confidence of the people in the 
institutions and not building the institutions. As such, its humanitarian assistance package 
should be well delivered to vulnerable population to instill such trust. 
 
5.7 Current Focus of AMISOM in Contributing to Peace in Somalia 
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According to respondent I, the current focus of AMISOM is on stabilization and integration 
of the community.  Community integration precedes stabilization, followed by conflict 
transformation. This is because there is no longer active conflict and the need for building 
community cohesion is essential to ensure that community denounces armed groups. 
However, AMISOM’s focus is still centered on providing support to the FGS in its efforts to 
stabilize the country, and foster political dialogue and reconciliation; reducing the threat 
posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; and providing humanitarian 
assistance to returning refugees and IDPs (Interview, with respondent I, February 2015). In 
this sense, AMISOM is also focused on military insurgency to gain territory, and curb Al- 
Shabaab from the rest of Somalia. In essence, AMISOMs current focus seems to be 
supporting the FGS in making its government stronger in Somalia. For instance, AMISOM 
continues to train the Galmudug regional assembly members, and help them to create a 
parliamentary and legislative assembly. AMISOM trains the Galmudug legislators to 
establish strong institutions capable of serving the public effectively. Further, AMISOM 
usually trained newly recruited soldiers in Baidoa, to execute their duties diligently, and to 
fight against element that threatens the countries security and stability. More than 200 
recruited soldiers completed a 6 months para-military training. The mission also continues to 
donate office equipment to the Somali police force for use in maintaining law and order in 
Mogadishu’s Hodan district. The missions focus on conflict transformation is farfetched, as 
the rift between the FGS and the regional administration of Puntland and Somaliland is wide, 
and remains fragile.  
 
5.8 The Extent of AMISOMs Contribution to Conflict Transformation in Somalia  
Whereas respondents noted some positive contribution of the mission in Somalia’s conflict 
transformation, respondent A, D and F were very objective to this process. They noted that 
“clan differences will always occur and can be resolved with time. However, such differences 
only get complicated when arms are involved’’. Therefore, they thought that the success of 
the mission in reconciling certain clans should be seen as a marginal success. The 
respondents further noted that AMISOM has no disarmament mandate. The mission has no 
clear mandate to reconcile human relations. Its mandate is also not clear regarding livelihood 
support to the people. However, In addressing the issues of clan differences and support to 
conflict transformation, respondent A noted that “the mission has the mandate to ‘foster 
political dialogue and reconciliation’ which involves relationship transformation, however, 
the achievement of AMISOM in the regard has been limited’’ (Respondent A, 2015). 
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According to many respondents, the mandate of AMISOM is stabilization focused which 
does not necessarily speak towards addressing the root causes of the conflict. Respondent A 
further eluded that “this would serve as major flaws in AMISOMs conflict transformation 
efforts after stabilization’’. Whereas this could be the case for AMISOM, it is often a major 
existing gap in all peace operations in Africa.  
 
Whist the above mandate speaks towards addressing the root causes of the conflict, the 
research finds that the mission’s sole mandate is a counter insurgency strategy that supports a 
counter insurgency approach in Somalia. A counter insurgency approach does not necessarily 
address the root causes of the conflict.  To buttress this, the mission has a huge budget to 
support the military component of the mission, but that does not apply similarly to the 
civilian component that can really interact with the community and undertake peace-building 
tasks aimed at transforming relationships by addressing inequalities. The mandated civilian 
personnel strength of AMISOM is 70, however, 38 international staff and 18 Nairobi and 
Mogadishu based civilian staffs has been deployed. The limited number of civilian personnel 
deployed in the mission could reduce the mission’s ability to substantially build institutions 
that may address the root causes of the conflict, and transform the peace. However, 
respondent G and H comment that “the current focus of the mission also does not seem to 
largely emphasize on building relationships amongst clans and regional administrations, thus 
limiting conflict transformation in Somalia’’ (Interviews with respondent G and H, April 
2015). 
 
Somalia will conduct elections in 2016, whether the elections will constitute a big problem to 
the peace process is not clear. The conduct of elections could be seen as a success and that 
AMISOMs mandate has been implemented successfully, but respondent A and K cautioned 
that “elections would not heal the effect of armed insurgency on the people of Somalia’’ 
(Interviews with respondent A-K January 2015). This is mainly because the relationship and 
trust between Somali people and the state institutions has not been reconciled.  The mission 
has played divers role in facilitating various peace processes, political dialogue and 
reconciliation meetings and conferences in places like Djibouti, Kenya and Egypt. It needs to 
do more at the local and regional level. The focus of AMISOM in making or building a 
government for Somalia without addressing the root causes of the conflict will form a big 
fundamental gap to the Somali peace process. There are limited structures on the ground for 
reconciliation that will address the nature or magnitude of the Somali conflict.  
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5.8.1 Main Challenges to AMISOMs Conflict Transformation Efforts in Somalia 
According to all respondents interviewed, AMISOM has successfully altered the aggression 
of armed groups, and have captured most of the strongholds of Al-Shabaab.  Whilst this is a 
success, it is a military solution which does not have durable sustainability. Respondent K 
noted that “there is the possibility of defeating Al-Shabaab today, but the possibility of them 
coming back tomorrow should not be overlooked’’. Armed groups are now operating under 
cover which require long time coordinated strategy to dispense atrocities from their parts. 
While this is a success, it has further complicated AMISOMs approach to protect civilians, in 
the sense that despite the fact that Al-Shabaab has been pushed into hiding, the mission 
cannot easily identify and altered potentially planned attacks targeting the civilian population 
(Interviews with AMISOM – respondent J and K, March 2015). 
 
According to the data collected from various respondents, Al-Shabaab retains the capacity to 
disrupt the political process by frequently targeting the FGS, regional administrations, and 
Somali security forces, AMISOM, the UN and civilians. Despite the territorial gains made by 
AMISOM and the SNA, Al-Shabaab is still in control of a number of key locations. The 
group is currently concentrated in the Juba Valley corridor, as well as in the Hiraan and 
Galgaduud regions 
Inadequate resources: “ACCORD and AMISOM noted that ‘’ the civilian component who 
have the function to transform the conflict and build relationships for peace is the least 
supported in the missions budget. They noted that the civilian component is not implementing 
many conflict transformation activities because of lack of funding’’. Based on the data 
obtained from the interviews with ACCORD and AMISOM, Item 6 in the missions mandate 
above has been challenging to implement because of lack of resources. Somalia needs 
medical kits, economic revitalization, livelihood support, and compensation to those who lost 
properties, social services like schools and well trained teachers. The respondents noted that 
the mission has not sufficiently supported these under its humanitarian mandate. Therefore, 
when Somalia comes out of conflict, its education system for instance will not be at the same 
level with the global community. AMISOM does not have the resources to build hospitals for 
rape victims and those who have sustained everlasting injuries. According to the mission’s 
mandate, AMISOM should coordinate and find the required resources, but this coordination 
is difficult because of economic challenges on the continent (Interviews with ACCORD and 




Also, there is the lack of resources to implement some of the tasks the mission was given to 
carry out. These are Civil Affairs related functions. The mission has a very good mandate to 
support conflict transformation efforts but have no resources to fully implement tasks that are 
to be performed by civilian personnel. About 80-90% of the budget goes to the functions of 
the military component, leaving little room for supporting relevant institutions and 
administrative structures relevant to bring an end to insurgencies.  
 
Respondent E noted that: 
 “there is also the continued presence of armed groups and recurring violent activities; 
limited progress on the political front in terms of dialogue and reconciliation of the 
key actors; and the weak institutions of state to take ownership of the support 
provided by the mission’’(Interview with respondent E, March, 2015).  
This is causing major setbacks for the mission in its conflict transformation efforts.  
 
Further, there is the issue of the mandate problem, wherein the mission does not have a 
specific mandate to address root causes of conflict. Also, the different regional and 
international interests and the lack of a common approach to the peace process are major 
challenges to AMISOMs conflict transformation efforts in Somalia. 
 
The research finds that the mission is also challenged in the stabilization phase of its 
operations. Most of the areas liberated from Al-Shabaab needed extended good governance 
from government - putting in place legitimate credible structures to give people water, food, 
education and relief supply. This is an area where emphasis should be placed to ensure the 
security, stability and transformation of liberated areas.   
 
5.8.2 Relevance of Conflict Transformation in Addressing the Conflict’s Root Causes  
Responses gathered from respondents within ACCORD indicated that “being an African 
mission, it is easy for AMISOM to relate to the Somali people in contrast to previous UN 
missions in Somalia. This relationship has contributed to build success for AMISOM, as the 
troops comprised African troops’’ (Interview with ACCORD, 2015). ACCORD further 
indicated that “the only group that does not want AMISOM in Somalia i {are] armed groups 
that do not want the mission to integrate the people’’. Thus, having relationships transformed 
among Somalis can be very beneficial to sustain the progress that AMISOM has made so far 
in curbing insurgencies. If the relationships are not built, there will be no likelihood for stable 
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peace to be attained even after the elections. This is also equal to a bottom-up approach in 
conflict transformation theory. If the bottom-up approach is applied - focusing on capacity 
building, infrastructure development, improving livelihoods of the community, and peace 
advocacy is undertaken, then the conflict will likely be transformed for a long term. 
 
Respondents from APSTA noted that “AMISOM has not fully cultivated positive 
relationships between the entire core Somali regional administration, yet the mission is 
working towards merging these administration with the FGS’’ (Interview with APSTA, 
2015).  They further indicated that “The Puntland administration on the other hand does not 
want to merge with the FGS. This is mainly because the regional administration does not 
want to seek blessings from the FGS in Mogadishu for all their engagements in the 
diaspora’’. This rift is a potential gap that will serve as a gateway for Al-Shabaab to emerge. 
Wherever minority groups are isolated, Al-Shabaab will emerge from these groups. This 
further explains that minority clan structures needs to be integrated into bigger clans and 
benefit equally in all spheres.  Al-Shabaabs are local Somalis fighting their way through. 
Therefore, the transformation of relationships, trust and unity between the FGS and the 
regional administration will promote conflict transformation which can address the conflict 
and deter potential future security relapse (Interviews, with APSTA 2015). The research 
tested conflict transformation theory and its relevance in addressing the root causes of the 
conflict. It finds that the aspect of the relationship between the mission and the people have 
contributed to the success of the mission so far. 
 
One reason why this research agreed that conflict transformation in the form of relationship 
building is a strong option for addressing the conflict in Somalia is demonstrated in the case 
study put forward by respondent J. Respondent J noted that the  
“disputed Sool Region continues to experience tension after Somaliland forces seized 
Taleex town on 12 June 2014, and disrupted a conference organized by leaders, elders 
and supporters of the self-declared Khatumo State” (Interviews with respondent J, 
2014).  
In response, the Puntland government reinforced its military presence in the contested region. 
The “Khatumo” leaders in Sool then relocated to Saaxdheer - an area in the Sool region. 
Respondent J noted that, 
“On 14 August 2014, Ali Khalif Galayr was elected as the new President of the 
“Khatumo State”. Relations between the FGS and Puntland remain strained as 
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Puntland announced a freeze on all cooperative relations and activities with the FGS 
in reaction to the signing of the Agreement on State formation in Galguduud and 
Mudug on 31 July 2014” (Interview with respondent J, 2014).  
Respondent J also noted that:  
“on 2 August 2014, the President of Puntland - Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, 
suspended co-operation with the FGS and withdrew 10 Parliamentarians following the 
Government’s endorsement of the new “Central State” in Mudug and Galgudud 
regions. Puntland officials objected to the announcement by the  FGS government of 
an administration for Mudug and Galguduud, which is located in Puntland, and has 
been at peace in the past 16 years because, Puntland managed to address the root 
causes of their conflict” (Interview with respondent J, December 2014).   
 
It is the opinion of the research that this disagreement between the FGS and regional 
administrations in Somalia is not healthy in the attempt to build a unified Somalia. Also, the 
FGS attempt to form one government for Somalia seem to be contested by Puntland and 
Somaliland – who have largely steered their own affairs in a long time.  In such a complex 
and dynamic environment, trust is required between all varying parties to come to an agreed 
framework on how Somalia should be governed. With the complexity of the situation, an 
agreed framework on how Somalia should be governed is highly unlikely to hold, as any 
disloyalty, or mistrust between groups or individual would lead to an unfriendly decision, 
actions or policies. In this case, all parties to the welfare of Somalia should start to work on 
building relationships building and trust for sustainable peace. Therefore, conflict 
transformation is relevant in the Somalia context.  
 
5.9 Progress in the Implementation of AMISOMs Mandate 
AMISOMs mandate is clearly explained in “paragraph 9 of communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM 
(CCCLVI), and in the first paragraph of UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (2013) 
(AMISOM, 2013). The research finds that AMISOM has made sustained progress towards 
the implementation of its mandate and of the view that AMISOM has contributed to the 
following conflict transformation processes in Somalia as identified by all respondents: 
5.9.1 Support to Somalia National Security Forces 
Based on the findings from the literature on the root causes of the Somali conflict, it was 
found that military repression and division on clan based affiliation was among the causes. In 
an effort to transform this root cause, AMISOM has and continued to support the SNSF in 
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building their capacity through training, mentoring and operational guidance. The mission 
has trained forces drawn “mainly from the rank and file of the SNSF, thus leaving knowledge 
gaps in junior and middle leadership positions” (Interview with respondent K, 2015). In order 
to fill these gaps, AMISOM has begun working with the FGS and other partners to undertake 
the training of a new corps of junior officers to assume platoon and company command 
positions in the SNSF (Interview with AMISOM – respondent K, 2015). Respondents B also 
noted that: 
“With respect to the Somalia Police Force (SPF), the AMISOM police component 
continues to support the reform, restructuring, re-organisation and professionalization 
of the Somali Police Force (SPF) though various programmes and activities. 
AMISOM police, including the Formed Police Units (FPUs), worked closely with the 
SPF at various police establishments in Mogadishu, to mentor, train and advise 
Somali police officers on a wide range of policing issues, including human rights and 
the management of crime” (Interview with AMISOM – respondent B, 2014).  
Recognizing the importance of mitigating security challenges, as well as the need for skills 
transfer in managing police operations to the Somalia Police Force (SPF), the research finds 
that “the AMISOM police component, established and equipped a Joint Police Operations 
and Coordination Centre (JPOCC), to effectively co‐locate AMISOM police and the SPF” 
(Interview with respondent B, 2015). 
 
Based on the analysis of the research findings, the co‐location has enhanced the conduct and 
coordination of police operations in Mogadishu and its environs.  Respondent B noted that 
“the JPOCC facilitated joint public safety and security activities in Mogadishu and environs, 
during which several suspects were detained and illegal weapons and ammunition recovered 
and handed over to the SPF” (Interview with AMISOM – respondent B, 2015). These actions 
have contributed to preventing possible attacks from Al-Shabaab and other criminal 
activities, thereby building the confidence of the population in the ability of the FGS to 
ensure the security of lives and property. AMISOM FPUs have also started the 24‐ hour joint 
confidence‐building and public reassurance joint patrols with the SPF in Mogadishu, which 
has contributed significantly to improved security situation in the city.  
 
According to interviews conducted with the Somali Police,  
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“AMISOM has equipped all police stations and directorates in Mogadishu with 
computers, furniture and police registers which have served to enhance the daily 
workings of the SPF With regard to training support, AMISOM police have 
conducted a Public Order Management course in Djibouti for 200 SPF officers, in 
partnership with the Italian Carabinieri and financial support from the Italian 
government. This course enhanced the performance of the SPF in the conduct of day 
and night time patrols, stop and search, and barricade and search operations. A similar 
training was also conducted for 871 SPF Officers at General Kahiye Police Training 
Academy in Mogadishu, wherein the officers, who are being trained with support 
from AMISOM police, will be deployed in Mogadishu and other locations across the 
country. The mission has done a lot in building the capacity of the security sector not 
only in security measures, but also in database management and best practices 
inherent in police reforms” (Interviews with respondents I, J & K).  
 
5.9.2 Creation of Conditions for the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance 
The research finds that poverty, illiteracy and youth unemployment are amongst the root 
causes of the conflict in Somalia. 70% of respondent indicated these as amongst the root 
causes of the conflict.  In responding to this and also the humanitarian impact of the conflict, 
the research finds that AMISOM continued to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance in Somalia, “by coordinating humanitarian activities and cooperating with UN 
humanitarian agencies and other actors working to ensure greater access” (Interviews with 
respondents D&F, 2015). According to respondent D and F,  
“the mission has secured humanitarian entry points, enabling humanitarian actors to 
address the needs of the Somali population in areas under government control” 
(Interviews with respondent D&F, 2015).  




Figure 7: Areas in Somalia under AMISOM’s control 
Respondent H noted that  
“in coordination with the UN humanitarian agencies, AMISOM has also facilitated 
the voluntary return and resettlement of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs), and continues to provide lifesaving support to the needy population, 
especially to those areas where humanitarian actors are absent or have limited access” 
(Interview with Respondent H, 2015).  
These supports include provision of potable water, basic healthcare services and basic social 
services. Respondent H noted that,  
“during the recent flooding in Jowhar, AMISOM donated medicines to the Governor 
of Middle Shabelle for distribution to those affected by the floods. In promoting 
hygiene and humanitarian assistance, AMISOM has also closely worked with the 
Mayor of Mogadishu to rehabilitate four water wells in Hamar Weyne, Hamar Jabjab, 
Wadajir and Dharkenley Districts of Mogadishu” (Interview with respondents H, 
2015). 
 
5.9.3 Support to the Public and Civil Service of Somalia 
Whilst building relationships between antagonist groups is one part of solving the problem 
according to the theory of conflict transformation, building state institutions through the 
support of International actors represents another. In contributing to Somalia’s existing state 
building processes, Respondent I noted that “AMISOM has supported the public and civil 
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service institutions of Somalia by facilitating basic and refresher training of 120 civil servants 
comprised of secretaries, administrative officers and protocol officers” (Interview with 
respondent I, 2015). These efforts have helped to improve the working conditions of the civil 
service sector, and facilitated an increase in public service delivery (Interview with 
respondent I, 2015). .  
 
5.10 Conclusion  
The AMISOMs mission’s activities are largely focused on counter-insurgency strategies; the 
expansion of the FGS state authority, capacity building of security forces, civil service, and 
the protection of the FGS. Thus, whereas the mission also works with local authorities and 
civil society in reconciliation processes, its engagements in this regard are minimal. With the 
dynamic political, social and cultural strata of Somalia, the mission would need to engage in 
conflict transformation on a larger scale with the varying administration of Somalia, in order 
to build trust and reach a mutually beneficial decision of how Somalia would be governed. 
The research also finds that the missions focus is ideally not on addressing the root causes of 
the conflict even though it engages with it to some extent. Therefore, the missions CONOPs 
or mandate should be revised to include a specific task to support the transformation of 
potential conflict relationships that build trust, and address relevant concerns aimed at 
building a unified Somalia. The mission is also undertaking minimal role in addressing the 
root causes of the conflict. As such, the missions mandate and CONOPs should also create an 
opportunity for activities that address the root causes of the conflict. The research hypotheses 
was justified, in the sense that it put forward a substantiated fact that showcased the necessity 
for  conflict transformation efforts for larger Somalia to enjoy long-term stability like its 














Conclusion and Recommendation 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter assess whether the aim and objective of the study were met. It also summarizes 
the concluding remarks of the research, and highlights concrete recommendations targeted to 
the AU on possible options to conflict transformation that could bring an end to the Somali 
conflict.  
The aim of this research was to examine AMISOM’s contribution to ending the conflict in 
Somalia, with reference to its role in addressing the root causes of the conflict directly or 
indirectly as its implements it mandate, using the conflict transformation theory.  The main 
objectives of this study were to:  
 Examine AMISOM’s contributions to ending the conflict in Somalia.  
 Identify and map the nature and role of the mission in conflict transformation efforts  
 Develop initiatives which AMISOM can undertake to effectively transform the conflict in 
Somalia 
 Provide concrete recommendations on  the role of AMISOM  in  transforming the conflict 
in Somalia   
This chapter is organized in the following sequence. Introduction to the chapter, the aim and 
objectives of the research, concluding summary of AMISOMS role in Somalia, the 
recommendations proffered to the AU on addressing the conflict in Somalia, and finally, the 
conclusion.   
 
6.2 AMISOM’s Role in Somalia  
The research was able to examine AMISOMs contributions in bringing an end to the Somali 
conflict, through the findings identified. The findings showcased that AMISOM has taken 
control of most part of Somalia, and has brought stability and peace to those areas under its 
control. Furthermore, the civilians that are living in areas under the control of AMISOM have 
access to basic humanitarian assistance, and trading has resumed in most parts of the country. 
The analysis from the literature review provided a solid basis to understand the role and 
responsibilities of relevant actors that are complementing the efforts to AMISOM in keeping 
the peace as well as in addressing the root causes of the conflict. Thus, the findings build on 
from the literature review which indicated that though the missions mandate does not aim to 
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directly address the root causes of the conflict, it does address some root causes of the 
conflict indirectly through the empowering of Somali security forces, reconciliation of 
different clans and regions and the extension of state and traditional authorities. The research 
has it linage from the literature review and theoretical framework that proffer an alternative 
solution and approach to transforming the conflict in Somalia through institution building, 
strengthen of security forces and through conflict transformation or reconciliation. Based on 
this analogy, the research was able to meet it second objective which aim to identify and map 
out the nature and role of AMISOM in conflict transformation in Somalia. It finds that 
AMISOM has and continues to support reconciliation meetings and governance reform in 
Somalia. Based on the relevance of the theoretical framework on the research, the research 
was able to utilize conflict transformation theory, approaches, lessons and applicability to 
suggest or recommendation on reconciliation or relationship building AMISOM can 
undertake to at the Somali regional and administrative level. The analysis from the literature 
review, theoretical framework, study area, and research findings provided a strong support 
from which the research draws most of it recommendations from. The methodology of the 
research also supported quality data gathering which makes the research achieve its stated 
objectives. Based on the findings from the research, the four research questions were 
successfully answered. The findings explore the extent to which AMISOM has contributed to 
conflict transformation in Somalia, it highlight the role AMISOM should play in conflict 
transformation and also identified the gaps and limitations that inhibit AMISOM from 
contributing to conflict transformation in Somalia. The existence of these empirical findings 
in the research satisfied the objectives of the study.  
The research finds that AMISOM has brought some amount of stability to Mogadishu, where 
ordinary populations are conducting businesses on normal bases. Overall, the situation in 
Somalia continues to progress positively. The Somali people and leaders should capitalize on 
the security gains made by AMISOM, the Somali security forces and their allies (AMISOM) 
and the Ethiopian troops, to further peace and prosperity. The Government of Somalia must 
utilize the current security progress as an opportunity to focus on transforming the conflict. 
By reviewing the background and nature of the conflict in Somalia, this chapter brings to 
light the importance of the unity of community structures to bring stability in the country. 
The people of Somalia have suffered immensely for decade, many lives have been lost, many 
children, and aged have been deprived of their right to survival and heritage. It is evident that 
a fundamental change in attitude and behaviour is needed to bring about lasting peace. To 
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address this fundamental change, the root causes of the conflict should be addressed.  
Therefore, the objective of this study, which is geared towards assessing AMISOMs 
contributions to ending the conflict and maps the need for more focus on conflict 
transformation, was met. 
“The joint AMISOM and SNA operations have resulted in the recovery of sixteen districts, 
but seven districts remain under Al-Shabaab’s influence, and their recovery will be the main 
objective in the next military phase from 2015. While applauding the successes recorded so 
far, it is necessary to also take stock of the challenges that AMISOM and the FGS continue to 
face going forward” (Summary of research findings, 2015). Therefore, topics illustrated in 
this research provided highlights on the current state of security in Somalia, the contributions 
of AMISOM to bring stability to Somalia, and the challenges faced by the mission in 
transforming the Somali conflict. These topics help to unpack reasons for the focus on 
conflict transformation in the process of stabilization. 
Therefore, it is the view of the research that the mission’s activities are largely focused on 
counter-insurgency strategies; the expansion of the FGS state authority, capacity building of 
security forces, civil service, and the protection of the FGS. Thus, whereas the mission also 
works with local authorities and civil society in reconciliation processes, its engagements in 
this regard is minimal. With the dynamic political, social and cultural strata of Somalia, the 
mission would need to engage in conflict transformation in a larger scale with the varying 
administration of Somalia, in order to build trust and reach a mutually beneficial decision of 
how Somalia would be governed. The research also finds that the missions focus is ideally 
not on addressing the root causes of the conflict even though it engages with it to some 
extent. Therefore, the missions CONOPs or mandate should be revised to include a specific 
task to support the transformation of potential conflict relationships that build trust, and 
address relevant concerns aimed at building a unified Somalia. The mission is also 
undertaking minimal role in addressing the root causes of the conflict. As such, the missions 
mandate and CONOPs should also create an opportunity for activities that address the root 
causes of the conflict. The research hypotheses was justified, in the sense that it put forward a 
substantiated fact that showcased the necessity for addressing the root causes of the conflict 




6.3 Recommendations for Addressing the Conflict in Somalia 
Despite the peace enforcement role of the mission, the mission can be involved at the 
strategic political level in the reconciliation efforts between the various parties to the conflict. 
The mission can provide technical support to state institutions involved in conflict 
transformation activities, and create conducive environment for political processes in 
facilitating trust building and relationship between clans and armed groups. Further, as part of 
this facilitation processes, the mission can work with all stakeholders to support dialogue and 
reconciliation, facilitate efforts aimed at the development and the re-establishment of 
governance structures, rule of law institutions and the restoration of both physical and social 
infrastructure of Somalia. AMISOM can further provide support to the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups as well as security sector reform processes. 
The AU should focus on more robust peace enforcements and a simultaneous bottom-up 
conflict transformation approach with a broader focus on improving the life of Somalis. 
Engagement with local leadership: AMISOM should focus its engagement at the grassroots 
level and speak to the local leadership on ways to start planning and working together as one 
Somali community; and more particularly on how to rebuild Somalia without focusing on 
elections. Elections will likely deter AMISOM on focusing on the humanitarian needs of the 
people in an attempt to address the underlying causes of the conflict. 
Political dialogue: the parties to the conflict must agree through a political dialogue to stop 
fighting. Without this, all the interventions would be addressing the effects of the conflict or 
its immediate causes and not the root causes. Puntland and Somaliland who have declared 
independence need to come back to the negotiation table and agree for those regions to be 
part of Somalia. All the areas occupied by Al-Sbabaab should be recaptured to extend state 
authority to every part of Somalia. The institutions of the state need to be further strengthen 
to be more effective.  
The establishment of Somali Regional Administration: AMISOM should established 
regional administration in Somalia that is able to influence the society. The regional 
administration available so far that have been able to maintain peace in certain areas is set up 
by Somalis themselves. These are Puntland, Somaliland, Khatumo, Mugug and South 
Western state.  The research supported Menkhaus (2006) suggestion that 
 “decentralised government would also end a trend started by the Italians of 
attempting to bring together disparate parts under a strong central government. 
Advocates of some form of decentralised, federal or even confederal systems claimed 
that only a decentralized approach can guarantee local communities protection from a 
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central state dominated by another lineage by giving the clans more responsibility in 
local government, ownership of projects, and their results are shared by the 
communities at the local level. Focusing the ownership of projects at a local level 
creates strong local government institutions, which become reactive and sensitive to 
what the citizens need when compared to a top-down western government style” ” 
(Menkhaus, 2006: p.83).  
However, decentralization has its advantages and challenges as seen in several examples 
throughout Africa (Barrett, Mude, & Omiti, 2007). According to Garcia & Sunil (2008), 
“proponents of decentralization will argue that it brings government accountability, 
community empowerment, and efficiency in the use of public services as well as an improved 
local and national governance” (Garcia & Sunil, 2008: P.8). 
Increased donor support: the lack of donor support to the civilian component of the mission 
is limiting conflict transformation effort. Civilian functions like Civil Affairs roles should 
have been instrumental to support AMISOM in establishing relevant regional administration 
and support local institutions in Somalia. The lack of resources to support relevant civil 
affairs roles and functions should be corrected in order to support reconciliation and local 
institution building in Somalia. AMISOM should pursue these efforts in order to address the 
conflict. 
Utilizing relevant policy frameworks: the AU policy framework for post-conflict 
reconstruction should be implemented in Somalia to support conflict transformation and 
peace. This also speaks to the utilization of expertise in Africa, as well as learning from the 
experiences of Rwanda to support conflict transformation in Somalia. 
Reformation of Somalia’s Decentralization System:  According to Upsall (2014), the 
Somali “government should provide an excellent point of departure for an attempt at creating 
a stable, functioning and decentralized government” (Upsall, 2014). Experience in the past 
has shown that an attempt to reform states decentralization often ends up with lesser results. 
Gordon Crawford and Christof Hartmann’s (2008) analysis of four decentralization case 
studies in Ghana, Uganda, Malawi and Tanzania concluded on this (Gordon et al, 2008: 240). 
Crawford & Hartmann (2008) noted that “three out of four had generally negative results” 
(Crawford & Hartmann, 2008: 234). This does not necessarily mean that will be the case for 
Somalia.  As explained by Crawford & Hartmann (2008) seem to be a “complex reform 
system requiring comprehensive changes in political, administrative and fiscal structures” 
(Crawford & Hartmann, 2008: 235). According to Upsall (2014), “It is precisely because 
these changes occurred within an existing government, which is the reason why 
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decentralization has proved to be so difficult, and often have less than desirable results. In the 
case of Somaliland the lack of functioning government should provide an excellent point of 
embarkation for an attempt at creating a stable, functioning and decentralized government” 
(Upsall, K.C, 2014). 
AMISOM continues to make progress despite the numerous challenges it faces. It is critical 
therefore, that all stakeholders to the peace process in Somali continue their efforts in 
supporting Somalia, while the international community should enhance its support to 
Somalia.  
According to the findings from AMISOM respondents,  
“the Roadmap adopted by the FGS demonstrates its commitment to complement and 
to build upon the security gains made by the joint AMISOM and SNA military 
operations. The political leadership of Somalia and all other stakeholders should 
continue to show selfless leadership, and resolve unity of purpose to consolidate the 
progress made. In this regard, it is critical for the government to undertake adequate 
sensitization on the stabilization strategy and state building process under the local 
government Act and provisional federal constitution. Recent outreach efforts and the 
positive outcomes of the engagements by the President and the Speaker of Parliament 
in Baidoa, as well as the Prime Minister’s engagements in Bulo Burto, Jowhar and 
Kismayo, are vivid demonstrations of how effective such sensitization could be in 
facilitating peace-building and state-building. At the same time, efforts to ensure 
constructive engagement between the FGS and Puntland should be encouraged” 
(Interview with AMISOM, 2015).  
The FGS would need sufficient civilian capacity and financial support to undertake this. 
AMISOM noted that 
“The FGS has to be given adequate financial and other support to implement its Vision 2016 
agenda. At the first meeting of the High-level Partnership Forum (HLPF) on the 
implementation of Somalia New Deal Compact, held in Mogadishu on 24 February 2014, 
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud appealed to partners to fulfil their pledged support, in 
order to enable the government implement its commitments under the Compact. The FGS 
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needs financial resources to implement its Roadmap, including the stabilization and 
establishment of state authority across the country, as well as in the newly recovered areas, 
ahead of the general elections in 2016” (AMISOM, 2015). 
Significant progress has been made in Somalia both at the political and security fronts. At the 
same time, the Somali stakeholders should be urged to stay on course and to demonstrate the 
required unity of purpose and action, in order to address all outstanding issues and fulfil the 
aspirations of their people for peace, security and stability.  
6.4 Conclusion 
AMISOM continues its effort to stabilize Somalia as it battles to ensure security throughout 
the country. During this period of conflict transformation in Somalia, poor relationship 
between clans, groups or individuals may pose a great threat to escalating the conflict, and 
will remain a major hindrance to peace-building efforts even after violence is over. For 
instance, some members of the Issaq Clan in Somaliand thinks they are part of Puntland 
which is mainly a Darod Clan entity. This struggle for identify and affiliation is creating 
further divide. The figure below indicated major Somali clan affiliation and identify.  
 
Figure 8: Maps showing major Somali clan affiliation and identity 
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According to a respondent, Somaliland is at peace not because of a well-functioning 
administrative and relationship system, but because top leaders from Somaliland are leaders 
of Al-Shabaab, and it is made up of one clan – thus limiting competition and rivalry. Also, all 
the clans from Somali are member of the FGS, and they are all competing for their interest.  
The theory of conflict transformation emphasizes a careful consideration in taking heed of the 
needs of all conflicting parties for a successful peace-building effort. Thus, conflict 
transformation attempts to address incompatibility which arises between parties as the 
process of stabilization continues. The recommendations above are all linked to conflict 
transformation theory which this research utilized to justify the need to address causes of the 
conflict, and transform relationships as was done in Somaliland and Puntland that have a 
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